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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND MOTOR VEHICLE
ACCIDENT LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
JOSEPHINE Y. KING*
INTRODUCTION
y Y should so much legal talent and energy be dissipated in litigating
the interminable procession of motor vehicle negligence cases? The
question is not a new one. Despite the fact that trials are actually com-
menced in only a fraction of the claims,1 they overflow court calendars.
Substitute methods to determine liability and loss are theoretically plau-
sible: a governmental agency patterned on Workmen's Compensation
Boards2 or a panel of jurists aided by medical and other experts. A special-
ized system for trying a class of disputes is not without precedent, as
witness arbitration of labor disputes, commissions to hear civil rights
matters and other controversies in areas of public concern. These are
outside the conventional procedural mold, yet encompassed by the
guarantees of substantive and procedural justice. Due process does not
mandate a full-scale jury trial, although some may believe that only this
path of glory leads to the "adequate award."
If, pursuing the matter beyond suggestions of administrative alterna-
tives to the present trial system, one suggests that the economic and legal
premises of tort liability are woefully inadequate to meet the accident
problem in human terms, one can expect the most formidable opposition.
Legal scholars have voiced their criticism for many years of a compensa-
tion system, geared to fault rather than loss, have recognized that many
accidents occur without assignable fault, have catalogued the hardship in
uncompensated cases, and have deplored the "jackpot justice" of
minuscule and mammoth awards.3
Some have advocated a system of social insurance and other methods
whereby loss is not shifted but distributed over all or a large segment of
society. Opponents contend that the expense of a social insurance system
* Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. See Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev.
1 (1961).
2. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts, § 112 (1956); W. Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts, § 86 (3d ed. 1964) ; Green, Automobile Accident Insurance Legislation in
the Province of Saskatchewan, 31 J. Comp. Leg. & Int. Law 39 (1949).
3. A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951); 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra
note 2 at §§ 11.4 & 13.2; Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile
Accidents to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences (1932);
James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered
Challenge, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 408, 408-11 (1959).
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is prohibitive, invites fraudulent claims, is impossible to administer and
would result in underpayment of claims.4
A sweeping transformation of the present system of compensation and
of trying accident claims is unlikely to win acceptance in the near future.'
This does not foreclose a more modest design. If we must live with the
system, we ought to make it work better. At the pleading, trial and post-
judgment stages, modifications, largely procedural, could result in mini-
mizing delays and repetitious litigation without undue jeopardy to valid
claims. The means lie chiefly in the fuller utilization of joinder procedures,
special verdicts and other trial techniques and in the expansion of the
availability of collateral estoppel.
A nettling, inherent contradiction lurks in pursuing the dual aims of
efficiency in adjudication and of protection of the accident victim's right
to recover. If, in the future, a judgment will affect more persons upon
more matters than the rules of the past have permitted, somewhere a
worthy claimant will be caught short. It becomes incumbent, therefore,
on the bench, during the transitional period, and upon the bar, at all times,
to inform litigants of the possible consequences of the decision in their
immediate case. Perhaps a system of court notification to all participants
in the event, at the outset of the suit, would be advisable. This notice
might be followed by a pretrial conference with prospective plaintiffs and
defendants alerting them to the possible effect of the first adjudication
upon their respective rights.
The consideration that has always weighed heavily upon the conscience
of the court in deciding the binding effect of a judgment is the possibility
of infringing upon the right of due process.' But perhaps a parallel may
be drawn between the expansion of collateral estoppel and personal juris-
diction7 and quasi in rem jurisdiction8 within the safeguards imposed by
due process of law.
4. Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 Yale
L.J. 216 (1965); James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents:
An Unanswered Challenge, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 408, 415-22 (1959); Keeton, Conditional
Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 441 (1959) ; Marx, Compensation Insurance
for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 15
Ohio St. L.J. 134 (1954); McVay, Reply to "The Case for Compulsory Automobile
Compensation Insurance," 15 Ohio St. L.J. 161 (1954).
5. Keeton, supra note 4, at 439.
6. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co.,
225 U.S. 111 (1912); Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31
N.E.2d 188 (1940); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758
(1937); Ordway v. White, 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1961).
7. Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow,
15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61 (1965); Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign
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The long-arm statutes of today are strangers to the concepts of Justice
Field in Pennoyer v. Neff,9 and yet it cannot be said that judicial regard
for due process has been brushed aside. The explanation is rather in the
fact that the concept has undergone change (very dramatically in criminal
procedure) and that the requirements of due process are fulfilled, although
jurisdictional bases have been greatly expanded. So too, to utilize col-
lateral estoppel in situations where heretofore privity or mutuality have
barred the way is not to advocate that preclusion should not operate
within the limits of due process. Jurisdictional concepts have changed in
response to the need for more effective protection of at least certain
classes-residents of the forum and those injured in the forum.' 0 Whose
rights are to be protected; and how and to what extent are determinations
of policy to be made in an ever evolving context? To encourage greater
flexibility in the application of collateral estoppel assumes that the courts
cannot, and will not, countenance anything less than a full and fair op-
portunity to be heard." Yet the time, place and conditions for exercising
that right may, in the broader community interest, no longer be a choice
dictated solely by the individual.
Initially, this article examines the tenor and terms of the statute gov-
erning responsibility for the operation of motor vehicles in New York.
Does legislative policy justify or counsel a particularistic approach to
the trial of accident claims? Does a main stream of common issues course
through such a high proportion of these cases that the conclusiveness of a
judgment may fairly bind more issues and more litigants here than in
other categories of disputes?
The discourse proceeds from the statutory and early case law to an
examination of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and its application in
vehicle accident litigation. Cummings v. Dresher,'-' a microcosm of the
complexities of preclusion is closely scrutinized. The article closes with
suggestions for procedural innovations.
Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 67
(1966).
8. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y2d 111, 216 N.E2d 312, 269 N.YS.2d 99 (1966); Jones
v. McNell, 51 Misc. 2d 527, 273 N.Y..2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Comment, 16 Buffalo L.
Rev. 769 (1967).
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. See Homburger & Laufer, supra note 7.
11. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 US. 32 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport,
247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897);
Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir. 1965); 1-B J. Moore,
Federal Practice, ff 0.406 [2] (2d ed. 1965).
12. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.YS.2d 976 (1966).
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I. THE POLICY OF OWNER RESPONSIBILITY AS EXPRESSED
IN THE PRESENT STATUTE
It is clear from the present provisions of Article VI of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law that the legislature intended innocent victims of negligently
caused accidents to have a financially responsible owner or operator to
respond in damages for personal injuries or property damages.' " The law
mandates that application for registration of a motor vehicle be accom-
panied by proof of financial security,14 and that such proof be continu-
ously maintained during the registration period.15 The license and car
registration of the owner-driver,'" and the license of a driver other than
an owner 17 shall be revoked where a motor vehicle has been operated
absent proof of financial security.' 8 Similarly, the privilege of a resident
or non-resident to operate a vehicle of foreign registry on the highways
of New York shall be revoked where the owner,19 or a driver not the
owner,20 does not meet the standards of financial security.2' The minimum
standards of insurance coverage, whether owner's22 or operator's28 policy
of liability insurance, are specified by the law.
Where, upon proof that financial security is no longer in effect, the
registration, driver's license or driving privilege has been revoked fol-
lowing a motor vehicle accident in New York, such privileges will not be
restored for a period of one year,24 and the Commissioner may require
13. The "Declaration of purpose" in the N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 310(2) reads: "The
legislature is concerned over the rising toll of motor vehicle accidents and the suffering and
loss thereby inflicted. The legislature determines that it is a matter of grave concern that
motorists shall be financially able to respond in damages for their negligent acts, so that
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and financial
loss inflicted upon them. The legislature finds and declares that the public interest can best
be served in satisfying the insurance requirements of this article by private enterprise
operating in a competitive market to provide proof of financial security through the methods
prescribed herein." Id.
14. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 312(1). The proof of financial security "shall be evidenced
by a certificate of insurance or ... a financial security bond, a financial security deposit
or qualification as a self-insurer . . . ." Id.
15. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(1) (a).
16. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(2)(a).
17. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(3) (a).
18. In the case of the non-owner driver, knowledge that proof of financial security was
not in effect is specified. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 318(3) (a)-(5) (a), as amended, (Supp.
1967).
19. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(4) (a).
20. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(5) (a).
21. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 341.
22. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 311(4) (a).
23. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(8).
24. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 318(9)(a)-(b).
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evidence that (1) no cause of action has been commenced against the
owner or operator within one year of the accident or that a release has
been obtained by the owner or operator, or (2) no judgment arising out of
such claim remains unsatisfied.2 ' Emphasis is added by the requirement
that where an owner or operator involved in an accident causing death
or bodily injury fails to submit proof of financial security within 48 hours
of the accident, the vehicle is subject to impoundment" and release may
take place only after final disposition of the claim "by payment of a
judgment or settlement by the owner, or by a final judgment in his
favor ... ."I' A violation of the financial security provisions of Article
VI constitutes a misdemeanor.
2 8
Under Article VII of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, -9 oper-
ators' licenses and registrations shall be suspended for delinquency in
satisfying judgments."0 In the case of bodily injury or death, any judg-
ment for damages is a predicate of the suspension power; in the case of
property damages, failure to satisfy a judgment in excess of one hundred
fifty dollars may result in suspension.3
Following the occurrence of an accident resulting in bodily injury or
death or property damage exceeding one hundred fifty dollars, the owner
or operator must furnish security within ten to sixty days to avoid sus-
pension, unless he had in effect at the time of the accident an automobile
liability policy.32
Section 388"3 is the crucial provision, fixing tort liability on the owner
of a vehicle negligently operated in the state of New York. It states:
1. Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and respon-
sible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use
or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such
owner ....
3. As used in this section, "ownaer" shall be as defined in section one hundred
25. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(9)(c)(I)-(2). See also N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law
§§ 318(11) (a)-(b).
26. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(12) (a).
27. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 318(12)(c).
28. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 319.
29. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
30. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 332(a) (Supp. 1967). A bond or insurance policy must be
in force at the time of the accident. See also N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 332(d), 341-43.
31. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 332(b). For applicability of suspension sanctions and
security requirements to non-residents see N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 338, 344.
32. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 335(a).
33. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388. The basic provisions of this section are traceable to
1924, when the N.Y. H'way Law of 1909 was amended to add § 282-e. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1924,
ch. 534. § 388 is derived from § 59 of the Veh. & Traf. Law as amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws
1958, ch. 577.
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twenty-eight of this chapter and their liability under this section shall be joint and
several.
This substantive provision is further implemented by a procedural
method to effect service of process upon a non-resident operator or non-
resident owner of a vehicle operated with his permission in New York:
§ 253. Services of summons on non-residents.
1. The use or operation by a non-resident of a vehicle in this state, or the use
or operation in this state of a vehicle in the business of a non-resident, or the use or
operation in this state of a vehicle owned by a non-resident if so used or operated
with his permission, express or implied, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment
by such non-resident of the secretary of state to be his true and lawful attorney upon
whom may be served the summons in any action against him, growing out of any
accident or collision in which such non-resident may be involved while using or
operating such vehicle in this state or in which such vehicle may be involved while
being used or operated in this state in the business of such non-resident or with the
permission, express or implied, of such non-resident owner; and such use or operation
shall be deemed a signification of his agreement that any such summons against him
which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him
personally within the state and within the territorial jurisdiction of the court from
which the summons issues, and that such appointment of the secretary of state shall
be irrevocable and binding upon his executor or administrator.
This section and its predecessors3 4 represent an exception to the ter-
ritorial concept of jurisdiction expounded in Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 and are
forerunners of the long-arm statutes,36 in which state policy and due
process have achieved new accommodation.
Both section 388 and section 253 evidence the concern of the New York
legislature to reach the owner and driver of a vehicle the negligent opera-
tion of which has proximately caused injuries to the person or property
of another. In the following passages the development, re-affirmation and
steadfastness of the legislative policy is illustrated by reference to statu-
tory provisions and case law.
Prior Legislation and the Issue of Permission in Single-stage Litigation
The counterpart of section 388 was introduced into the laws of New
York by way of an amendment in 1924 to the old Highway Law of 1909."
Prior to the enactment of section 282-e, common law prevailed in New
York; the owner was not liable for the negligence of a driver unless the
car was operated on the owner's business or the owner was present and
34. The provision dates back to N.Y. H'way Law of 1909, § 285-a as amended by N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 465. Its direct antecedent is § 52, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 568.
35. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
36. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1926). See
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953) ; Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
37. N.Y. H'way Law of 1909, § 282-e, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1924, ch. 534.
[Vol. 36
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
the driver was his agent, subject to his control.3 8 While proof that the
defendant owned the car raised a presumption that it was being operated
for his benefit,3 9 such presumption could be overcome by substantial evi-
dence that no agency relationship existed between the owner and the
allegedly negligent driver. The presence of the owner at the time of the
accident was in itself insufficient to impose liability where the driver was
employed and controlled by another."0 Therefore the presence and/or
permission of the owner had to be supplemented by control or benefit
under a theory of principal-agent accountability.41
Before the enactment of section 282-e, the recurring attempts to hold
the owner for the negligence of a member of his family driving his car
were met by the agency argument.4 2 If a son, in pursuit of his own pleasure
or benefit, borrowed his father's car and negligently caused injury to
another, the latter could not hold the father accountable since the driver
was not the agent of the owner. While noting that other jurisdictions
applied a "special rule" of agency in family use cases, the New York
Court of Appeals in 1917 concluded that such an approach was "novel,"
"weak" and "far-fetched. 43
But in this common law agency period, the issue of permission was
emerging as the critical factor. Liability did not attach to the owner,
even though the car was operated in the business of the owner, where
the injured party was a passenger invited or permitted to ride by the
driver against explicit instructions to the contrary by the owner. In such
cases, the court held that the driver, servant or agent, was acting outside
the scope of his employment.4 4 In a case which, analytically, straddles
the common law and statutory periods, Chief Judge Cardozo found the
owner liable under both theories, where the driver of the owner's truck
permitted another employee to operate it without the owner's authoriza-
tion.4" The basis of common law liability was the negligence of the servant
(driver) who continued on the truck and had the power and authority
38. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N.E. 78 (1917); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220
N.Y. 111, 115 N.. 443 (1917).
39. Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N.Y. 249, 253, 108 N.E. 406, 407 (1915).
40. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 NZE. 78 (1917).
41. Id.
42. See Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N.Y. 249, 108 N.E. 406 (1915); Tanzer v. Read, 160 App.
Div. 584, 145 N.Y.S. 708 (ist Dep't 1914); Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 111
N.Y.S. 1057 (1st Dep't 1908); Maher v. Benedict, 123 App. Div. 579, 108 N.Y.S. 228 (2d
Dep't 1908).
43. Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115-16, 115 N.E. 443, 444 (1917).
44. Goldberg v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 227 N.Y. 465, 125 N.E. 807 (1920); Rolfe
v. Hewitt, 227 N.Y. 486, 125 NX.. 804 (1920).
45. Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1927).
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to control its operation by the substitute.4" The statutory liability of the
owner was predicated on the authorized use of the truck even though the
method of operation (by the substitute) was unauthorized.47
Section 282-e of the Highway Law read as follows:
Every owner of a motor vehicle operated upon a public highway shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the
operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any
person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner.4 s
With the enactment of this provision, the consenting owner no longer
enjoyed protection from liability if the car was employed solely for a
permitted private purpose of the borrower-driver. 4 The statute expressed
two conditions precedent to liability, permission and legal use or opera-
tion. The differentiation between these two conditions does not seem
to appear clearly stated until Arcara v. Moresse ° since the earlier cases
concentrated upon the nature of the permission granted.
Thus, the owner was not held liable to injured passengers where he
could prove that his driver invited or permitted riders against the ex-
plicit instructions of the owner,5 ' or to other travelers on the highway
where the driver departed from the permitted area of use52 or where
the permitee entrusted the car to another without the owner's authoriza-
tion53 or where the owner had no knowledge that the car was borrowed,
knowledge being a prerequisite for consent or permission." In some
instances where the driver violated instructions of the owner, the court
concluded that the car was illegally used or operated and refused to im-
pose liability on the owner.55 It was also determined by the earlier cases,
that section 282-e was sufficiently broad to encompass owner liability
46. Id. at 163-64, 156 N.E. at 650-51.
47. Id.
48. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1924, ch. 534. See note 33 supra. The wording of the permission was
modified slightly when it became § 59 of the Veh. & Traf. Law of 1929 and again by
subsequent amendments.
49. See Psota v. Long Island R.R., 246 N.Y. 388, 393, 159 N.E. 180, 181 (1927).
50. 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932). See also Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 156
N.E. 650 (1927).
51. Compare Psota v. Long Island R.R., 246 N.Y. 388, 159 N.E. 180 (1927), with
Cohen v. Neustadter, 247 N.Y. 207, 160 N.E. 12 (1928).
52. Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929).
53. Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App. Div. 19, 214 N.Y.S. 543 (4th Dep't 1926).
54. Atwater v. Lober, 133 Misc. 652, 233 N.Y.S. 309 (Cayuga County Ct. 1929). See
also Owen v. Gruntz 216 App. Div. 19, 214 N.Y.S. 543 (4th Dep't 1926).
55. Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929); Fluegel v. Coudert, 2,14
N.Y. 393, 155 N.E. 683 (1927).
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both to passengers injured in his car as well as to travelers on the high-
way.5 6
The first condition, express or implied permission, has continued in the
same form through various changes in the law. The clause "negligence
in the operation" has since 1958 read "negligence in the use or opera-
tion, 5 7 and the word "legally," modifying "using and operating," was
deleted in the same year.58 While use as opposed to operation, and legal
or lawful use as opposed to unlawful use raised some difficulties in con-
struction, the early decisions were preoccupied with permission.
In Arcara v. Moresse," the factual situation resembled Grant v. Knep-
per,60 and a recent case of considerable importance in New York law,
Hinchey v. Sellers." Grant involved a permittee who was a servant driving
on his master's business. Arcara and Hinwchey involved the loan of a car to
a friend for the latter's personal benefit. The reasons which spared the
owner from liability in Hinchey are discussed subsequently. 2 But in
Grant and in Arcara, liability attached since the unauthorized substitute
driver was not banned from the car, and the original permittee or legal
user remained in the car as "master of the ship" after having turned the
wheel over to another. 3
The court drew a distinction between the owner's instructions to his
gratuitous bailee not to allow another to drive, and a restriction not to
accept another as guest in the car.14 The former, said the court, related
56. Cohen v. Neustadter, 247 N.Y. 207, 160 N.E. 12 (1928); Psota v. Long Island R.R.,
246 N.Y. 388, 159 N.E. 180 (1927). N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 282-e and its successors did
not abrogate the common law rule that where the driver was not the agent of the owner,
the driver's negligence did not bar the owner's claim for property damage. See Mills v.
Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E.2d 512
(1940); Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y.S. 102 (4th Dep't 1931), rev'd on
other grounds, 257 N. Y. 344, 178 N.E.2d 553 (1932). (The owner may recover from a third
person for damages to his car where he was not present, the car was used for the permittee's
own purposes, and the permittee and other driver were both negligent. The negligence of the
permittee is not imputed to the owner-plaintiff).
57. N.Y. Sess. Law 1958, ch. 577, § 1.
58. Id.
59. 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932).
60. 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1927). See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
61. 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
62. See text accompanying note 208 infra.
63. The court accepted the plaintiffs' version in Arcara, that the original borrower sat
beside his substitute driver when the negligence of the latter resulted in the collision. Brief
for Appellant at 22, Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932).
64. How valid is this distinction?
(1) A, in loaning his car to B, tells him: "You must not permit anyone else to drive it."
B ignores the instruction; C drives A's car negligently; A is liable.
(2) A, in loaning his car to B, tells him: "You must not permit C to go with you in the
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to the manner of operation and its violation did not make the "use"
illegal or without permission." Therefore, when the defendant owner in
Arcara consented to his nephew's borrowing the car for a personal errand
and while returning from the errand an invitee of the nephew negligently.
drove the car,66 the nephew was "legally using" the car and his violation
did not relieve the owner of liability. Legal use and permission persisted
despite disobedience to limiting instructions as to who might drive. 7
The decision may be interpreted as an expression of policy favoring
owner liability. Where there was some doubt that the permission included
the bailee's substitute, the foundation of owner liability was shored up by
holding that the bailee continued as legal user of the car. It is difficult
to see how the qualification "legally" (using and operating) accomplished
much more than the requirement of permission, although some cases
struggled to make a distinction. On the other hand, the dual terms "use"
and "operation" may represent distinct acts and the inclusion of both
meets the situation of the borrower who entrusts the driving to another.
The vast number of cases to determine owner liability under the suc-
cessors of the old statute, section 59,68 and the present section 3889 have
centered on the scope of permission." If the driver's negligence is rea-
sonably clear, proof will be concentrated on the circumstances and con-
ditions attending the loan of the car."' Thus in these single-stage cases,
unencumbered by questions of the judgment's effect upon subsequent
claims and claimants, it is apparent that the major issues are few and
repetitive-negligence (and contributory negligence) and permission.
The relatively uncomplicated and familar structure of the single lawsuit
under section 388 lends itself to the operation of estoppel when the liti-
gation reaches the multiple stage.
The premises which emerge from the half-century of statutory and case
law development in the motor vehicle field appear to be: that policy is
conspicuously plaintiff-oriented; that owner liability depends on imputed
negligence and permission; and that these decisive issues recur so con-
car." B ignores the instruction; C not only accompanies B but also drives A's car; A Is not
liable.
65. Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 214, 179 N.E. 389, 390 (1932).
66. Record at 23, 32, 40.
67. There are some contradictions in the testimony of the nephew as to whether or not
his uncle told him on this particular occasion not to permit anyone else to drive the car.
68. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 59 (now N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388).
69. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388.
70. See, e.g., Burmaster v. State, 7 App. Div. 2d 775 (3d Dep't 1958), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d
65, 163 N.E.2d 742, 195 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1959); Lozada v. Copeland, 207 Misc. 382, 138
N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
71. See text accompanying notes 208-15 infra.
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sistently that attorneys must recognize the importance of contesting them
vigorously and competently. Once these issues have been fully litigated
should their determination be binding only upon the original adversaries?
II. A.PPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
For the purpose of this paper, it is not essential to review the interesting
origins of res judicata7 2 (merger and bar)7 3 and of collateral estoppel.74
The tenets underlying both doctrines7" and the demarcation between them
spring from the elusive concept of a single cause of action.7" Preliminarily,
it is sufficient to point out that the application of collateral estoppel will
preclude the redetermination of certain issues of fact or law77 between
certain categories of parties. The crucial questions are, therefore, which
issues and which litigants?78 Are the classic rules restricting the avail-
ability of estoppel essential guardians of due process, or impediments to
insuring finality of judgments and avoidance of repetitious litigation?
The recent decisions of New York's highest court discard or remold
some of these rules and presage a cautiously expanded role for preclusion.
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the rules are being viewed from
a fresh perspective, dominated by the ever-lengthening shadow of negli-
gence cases.
Parties and Privies
The traditional requirements relating to parties invoking or resisting
the plea of collateral estoppel devolve into three separate concepts:
72. Buckland, Text-Book of Roman Law 695-98 (3d ed. 1963); Mfillar, The Premises of
the Judgment As Res Judicata in Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 Mich. L. Rev.
238 (1940); Scott, Introduction to Symposium on Res Judicata, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 214
(1954).
73. Restatement of Judgments §§ 47, 48 (1942).
74. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 Il. L.
Rev. 41 (1940).
75. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale L.J. 339, 342-49 (1948); Polasky,
Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 217 (1954) ; Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
76. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953); De Coss v. Turner &
Blanchard, Inc., 267 N.Y. 207, 196 N.E. 28 (1935); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C.
Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929); C. Clark, Code Pleadings, 137
(2d ed. 1947); McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 Yale L.J. 614, 638 (1925).
77. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Zimmerman v. Matthews Trucking
Corp., 203 F.2d 864, modified, 205 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1953); Restatement of Judgments
§§ 68, 70 (1942).
78. See generally Notes 52 Colum. L. Rev. 647 (1952); 52 Cornell L.Q. 724 (1967);
65 Harv. L. Rev. 820 (1962); 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158 (1961).
79. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967);
Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.YS.2d 976 (1966).
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privity, adversarial status and mutuality. Commencing with the proposi-
tion that a prior judgment binds only parties and their privies,8" the law
has defined privity as "mutual or successive relationships to the same
rights of property."'" Generally, the successor is bound in a suit com-
menced before the grant, sale, assignment or mortgage of the property to
which he has succeeded. 2 There is an identification of the successor and
the predecessor respecting the same legal right.83 The notion of privity
encompasses also those actually controlling a lawsuit while not appearing
as parties of record. 4 Finally, those whose interests are represented in
prior litigation brought on their behalf by a fiduciary are concluded by
the judgment,8 as are members of a class in class actions,80 and persons
with future interests.8"
Within the confines of this rule, that only parties and their privies are
bound, there is little prospect of liberalizing the use of collateral estoppel
in accident cases via modification of the established privity concept. An
80. Restatement of Judgments §§ 79, 83 (1942); 1 A. Freeman, Judgments, § 438 (5th
ed. 1925); The party must appear in the same capacity in both lawsuits, Restatement of
Judgments § 80 (1942) ; 1 Freeman §§ 418, 419. The court of appeals stated in St. John v.
Fowler, 229 N.Y. 270, 128 N.E. 199 (1920): "The rule is that a judgment in another action
cannot be admitted save for or against parties or privies to it; it being received on the
principle of estoppel, to which it is essential that it should be mutual." Id. at 274, 128 N.E.
at 200. See also Peare v. Griggs, 8 N.Y.2d 44, 167 N.E.2d 734, 201 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1960);
First Nat'l Bank v. Shuler, 153 N.Y. 163, 47 N.E. 262 (1897).
81. Haverhill v. International Ry., 217 App. Div. 521, 522, 217 N.Y.S. 522, 523 (4th
Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905 (1927) ; 1 Freeman, supra note 80, at
§ 439; S. Greenleaf, Evidence § 189 (16th ed. 1899).
82. 1 Freeman supra note 80, at § 440.
83. The privity requirement was interpreted in Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund
v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 148 N.E.2d 136, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958) to deny a defensive plea of
collateral estoppel. In the first action, Low sued the State of New York in the court of claims
for personal injuries resulting from a collision with a state police car. The court found the
state's servant negligent and Low free from contributory negligence. In the second action,
the Fund sued as statutory assignee of the cause of action of the widow of a passenger-
trooper in the state car. Low asserted that the Fund as a state agency was in privity with
the state as defendant in the court of claims action and that the prior judgment clearing
Low of negligence was assertable against the Fund. The court held, however, that provisions
of the Workmen's Comp. Law manifested the legislative intent to treat the Fund as a
private carrier and as such the Fund was not privy to the state and therefore not bound
by the former judgment. Cf. MVAIC v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 115, 224
N.E.2d 869, 278 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1967); Flynn v. State, 53 Misc. 2d 929, 280 N.Y.S.2d 512
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
84. Restatement of Judgments § 84 (1942); 1 Freeman, supra note 80, at § 431. A
prior judgment may be used against a secret party in control of the prior action. See
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941).
85. Restatement of Judgments § 85 (1942); 1 Freeman, supra note 80, at § 430.
86. Restatement of Judgments § 86 (1942); 1 Freeman, supra note 80, at § 436.
87. Restatement of Judgments § 87 (1942).
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inroad may be possible, however, by structuring the class of "party" to
include those who are "vouched in." The suggestion, subsequently devel-
oped, is that in negligence suits against drivers, the owners of the vehicles
involved should be given formal notification and a full opportunity to
defend with the result that they will be bound by the final judgment."'
Co-Parties
What happens to the general rule that only parties and their privies are
bound, when the prior judgment is not between a single plaintiff and a
single defendant but involves co-plaintiffs or co-defendants? The position
of the Restatement89 is that a judgment does not conclude parties," as to
issues not litigated between themselves. The rationale of the rule is that
one who is to be bound by a decision must have had his day in court to
confront his opponent qua opponent. It is perhaps conceivable that the
issue between one defendant and his former co-defendant may be differ-
ent." But this is not the usual case determining liability in motor vehicle
accidents; the issues are normally identical-negligence and contributory
negligence. Collateral estoppel cannot enter the picture if the issues are
not identical. As Justice Halpern stated in Ordway v. White :. 2 "If it is
demonstrated that, because of peculiar circumstances in a particular case,
the defendant did not have a full and fair opportunity to present his
version of the accident upon the trial . . it may well be held that the
adjudication in that action should not bar relitigation of the issue in his
subsequent action upon his own claim."93 Granted this flexibility and
discretion, Glaser v. Huette94 should no longer inhibit the availability of
collateral estoppel in a subsequent suit involving identical negligence
issues between former co-defendants.95
88. See Recommendations pp. 42-47 infra.
89. Restatement of Judgments § 82 (1942); 1 Freeman, supra note SO, at § 423.
90. The formal alignment of the parties is not decisive. The important fact is whether
the issues were raised and determined between them. I Freeman, supra note 80, at § 423.
91. See Self v. International Ry., 224 App. Div. 238, 230 N.Y.S. 34 (4th Dep't 1928);
Trotter v. Klein, 140 Misc. 78, 249 N.Y.S. 20 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
92. 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1961).
93. Id. at 502, 217 N.Y.S. 2d at 340. See Panakos v. Corbecki, 44 Misc. 2d 208 (Nassau
County Dist. Ct. 1964).
94. Glaser v. Huette, 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (lst Dep't 1931), aff'd mem,
256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).
95. For cases preceding Glaser which did not adhere to the adversarial requirements,
see, e.g., Eissing Chem. Co. v. People's Nat'l Bank, 205 App. Div. 89, 199 N.S. 342 affd
mem., 237 N.Y. 532, 143 N.E. 731 (1923); Duignan v. Pawlikowski, 134 Misc. 22, 235
N.Y.S. 125 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (plaintiff in the second action could not prove freedom from
contributory negligence since his negligence had been determined by the prior judgment for
the plaintiff against the co-defendants).
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In Glaser, the first action was brought in municipal court by injured
passengers against the driver of one car (Glaser) and the owner and driver
of the second car (Huette and Austin). Both drivers were found negligent
and judgment was entered against all of the defendants. The second suit
brought by former defendant Glaser charged that Austin's negligent
driving resulted in personal injuries and property damages to him. Defen-
dant Huette asserted "res judicata" as a defense. The court held that the
passengers' action determined only defendants' negligence toward the
passengers and did not settle the liability of the co-defendants inter se. 0
Between this appellate division decision, affirmed without opinion in
1931, and Minkoff v. Brenner 7 in 1962, lower court cases 8 found the
identity of issues test of Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.9 more persuasive than
the Glaser adversarial requirement.10 But decisions in the first' 0 ' and
second 10 2 departments adhered to the rule. Ordway v. White, 03 a fourth
department case in 1961 found Glaser no longer "controlling."
The confusion was not dispelled with Minkoff either by the appellate
division's memorandum 10 4 or the court of appeals' affirmance without
opinion.' The factual situation involved three vehicles. The collision
between plaintiff's and defendant's cars propelled the plaintiff's car against
a parked vehicle. The owner of the parked vehicle sued both drivers and
the owner of one car in municipal court (Borough of Queens) and recov-
ered against all of them. The former defendant driver then sued the
driver and owner of the second car in the City Court of New York City.
The latter moved to amend their answer to plead the municipal court
judgment as "res judicata" on the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence. The motion was denied and the denial affirmed by successive
appellate decisions'06 culminating in the affirmance by the court of
appeals.
107
96. 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374, 375 (1st Dep't 1931).
97. 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962).
98. See 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice II 5011.37, n.231
(1966); James v. Saul, 17 Misc. 2d 371, 184 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1958).
99. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
100. See Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc. 2d 994, 996-97, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686-87 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. 1956).
101. Friedman v. Salvati, 11 App. Div. 2d 104, 201 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1960).
102. Grande v. Torello, 12 App. Div. 2d 937, 210 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1961).
103. 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1961).
104. 13 App. Div. 2d 838 (2d Dep't 1961).
105. 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962).
106. 13 App. Div. 2d 838 (2d Dep't 1961).
107. 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962). For a subsequent lower
court opinion preferring Justice Halpern's rationale, see Sunshine v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.,
41 Misc. 2d 1037, 247 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1963). But see Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 52
Misc. 2d 404, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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What is currently needed in this narrow but troublesome sector of
collateral estoppel is a fully expounded ratio decidendi by the highest
court of New York laying Glaser to rest or offering convincing reasons
to sustain its viability. The prospect of contribution 0 8 would seem to be
a sufficient motivation for each defendant to hold in his co-party by
thrusting as much of the fault upon him as possible. No defendant's
attorney should be ignorant of this post-judgment opportunity to share
the damages and if his client cannot attain the whole loaf of exoneration,
the half loaf of contribution is better than none.
It is assumed above that the liability picture does not permit a separa-
tion of the co-defendants into an active and a passive wrongdoer.'" If such
a distinction could be alleged," 0 the secondary tortfeasor would have the
right to interpose a cross-claim in the nature of impleader."' Since the
cause of action in this type of cross-claim would bear a close relationship
to the plaintiff's claim and its outcome, a judgment would conclude all
parties of the main action and the cross-claim and operate as collateral
estoppel on the issues necessarily determined.
The availability of the impleader type of cross-claim under circum-
stances which make few demands on the cross-claimant, that is, where the
plaintiff in the main action has obligingly joined both defendants and
solved any difficulties of notice and basis jurisdiction and where a sub-
stantial portion of the evidence would be the same as in the main action,
should prompt its more extensive use by defense counsel.
If the courts do not take the initiative by overruling Glaser, then it is
recommended that serious consideration be given by the legislature to a
compulsory cross-claim in vehicle accident cases. The New York statutes
permitting cross-claims" 2 and counterclaims" 3 arising from any cause of
action the defendant possesses, clearly express a purpose of economy of
litigation. Where, as in an indemnity situation, the cross-claim rests wholly
or partially on the same factual foundation as the main action, one adjudi-
cation binding upon all claims is manifestly preferable in terms of con-
sistency, time and expense. If a defendant alleging a claim against his
co-party fails to utilize the impleader type cross-claim, he should risk the
108. N.Y. CP.L.R. §§ 1401, 1402.
109. See Berg v. Town of Huntington, 7 N.Y.2d 871, 196 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1959); Egan
v. Syracuse Savings Bank, 28 Misc. 2d 256, 209 N.YS.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Cole v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 24 Misc. 2d 221, 196 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
110. Mandello v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, 8 App. Div. 2d 845, 190 N.YS.2d 436 (2d
Dep't 1959); Valvo v. Hope's Windows, Inc., 230 N.Y-S.2d 956 (Sup. CL 1962). These
cases indicate that if there is a possibility of a right of indemnification, the motion to bring
a cross complaint will be granted.
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(b).
112. Id.
113. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(a).
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same consequences as one who fails to interpose a compulsory counter-
claim in federal court."
4
If a compulsory cross claim is a desirable procedural innovation in
accident cases, on the theory that co-defendants are genuine adversaries,
there is even more justification for introducing a compulsory counterclaim
in New York in this particular category of litigation. The substantial
liberalization in 1936 of the counterclaim rule in New York",, resulting
in a provision similar to CPLR section 3019(a) stopped short of any com-
pulsion. The Advisory Committee concluded that a mandatory rule was
not necessary or clearly advantageous." 0 Granted that collateral estoppel
alone would bar a second lawsuit in certain instances, a compulsory coun-
terclaim may accomplish more if asserted against the plaintiff and others,
by litigating the issues among parties and thus avoiding possible due
process difficulties when collateral estoppel or res judicata is later pleaded.
It seems necessary in this class of accident cases to supplement the
natural pressures which would motivate a defendant to bring his counter-
claim.
Mutuality
Where identical adversary parties seek to relitigate identical issues,
estoppel may operate with perfect mutuality. Each party is bound by the
prior judgment to the same extent as his opponent. Where this classic
symmetry is not present, courts have in varying degrees adopted an
offensive-defensive distinction. Collateral estoppel may serve as a shield
but not as a sword; it may be thus defensively invoked only against a
former plaintiff.
The first of these has heretofore, with few exceptions, been assiduously
observed in New York; the second has on occasion caused the courts some
pause but was not followed in Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v.
Emery." 8 The idea underlying the second limitation is that where a non-
party to the first action is permitted to use a judgment defensively against
a prior party, the latter must have occupied the position of a former
plaintiff who enjoyed the advantage of selecting the time, place and
strategy for pursuing his claim. A defendant, by contrast, might default
or exert only minimal opposition due to the inconvenience of the forum
114. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
115. N.Y. C.P.A. § 266 (now N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(a)).
116. 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 69-70 (1957).
117. "The estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage of the earlier adjudication
would have been bound by it." Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942).
118. 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937). But see the dissent in Elder v. New York & Pa.
Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 358, 31 N.E.2d 188, 192 (1940).
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or the smallness of the claim. Therefore, he should not later be visited
by the unanticipated consequences of his meager defense.
Such a restriction has not been a major deterrent to the availability of
collateral estoppel in a jurisdiction adhering to mutuality. The offensive-
defensive distinction was advocated on due process grounds for jurisdic-
tions rejecting mutuality, for example California, as evidenced by Bern-
hard v. Bank of America."9
As to the restriction upon the offensive use of collateral estoppel, Haver-
kill v. International Railway' - and Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania
Motor Express, Inc.Y2 1 expressed the rule that one not a party to the prior
adjudication might invoke the plea defensively only, against a former
plaintiff.
As stated earlier, if the parties in two suits involving the same cause of
action are identical and are adversaries to each other, there is no problem
in the assertion, affirmatively or defensively, of res judicata. But where
new participants appear in a second and different cause of action, the
doctrine of mutuality has been a limitation on those who may assert
collateral estoppel, whereas privity restricts the class against whom the
plea may be asserted.
The very narrow use that could be made of collateral estoppel, if the
mutuality requirement were absolutely enforced, has led to certain well-
founded exceptions: the indemnitor-indemnitee, master-servant and prin-
cipal-agent relationships, and identity of issues as evidenced in the Israel
case.
122
The first exception is founded on the duty of the indemnitor to make
good the loss suffered by the indemnitee through an adverse judgment.
Such indemnity may arise out of contract, statutel" or common law. A
119. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) ; see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel-
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957) (discusion of Justice
Traynor's now famous analysis of the difference between the criteria governing the pro-
ponent and the opponent of the plea).
120. 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mer., 244 N.Y. 582,
155 N.E. 905 (1927).
121. 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
122. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d I (1956).
123. An interesting case decided on the grounds of indemnification rather than collateral
estoppel is Liberty Mlut. Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 505 (1932).
The original law suit was by the administratrix against Colon for the wrongful death of her
husband. The judgment for the plaintiff established the negligence of the defendant and, in
the absence of contributory negligence, of the decedent. The employer's insurance carrier vas
thereupon obligated to pay $1000 into special funds under N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law
§§ 15(8)-(9) providing that an employer or his carrier shall make payments of $50 each
into specified funds where no persons are entitled to compensation. The statute also pro-
vided for an assignment to the carrier of a cause of action for his payments into the funds.
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contractual right of indemnification may obtain even though the indem-
nitor and indemnitee are primary and equally culpable tortfeasors with
respect to the public to whom they owe a duty. Their liability is thus joint
and several as is their duty. But as between the two, an arrangement may
exist whereby the indemnitor has contracted to pay claims against the
indemnitee.' 4
Common law indemnity or implied right of indemnification exists
where different degrees of fault are present. In such cases, the secondary
tortfeasor has a claim over against the primary tortfeasor if the former
is held to respond in damages. Collateral estoppel has been available de-
fensively to the secondary tortfeasor (indemnitee) where he is sued by
the same party involved in a prior litigation resulting in the exonera-
tion of the primary tortfeasor (indemnitor). 12
Thereupon the insurance company sued the same defendant to recover these payments. The
insurance company pleaded the judgment against defendant obtained by the administratrix as
conclusive of the negligence of the defendant.
The appellate division in granting summary judgment for the plaintiff in the second action
rested its decision on the right of the insurance carrier to be ifidemnified by the wrongdoer.
"It is a familiar doctrine that one who has been compelled to pay a judgment recovered
against him because of the wrongful act of a third person has an action over against such
person; and where such third person has had notice of the former action and an oppor-
tunity to defend, the judgment is binding and conclusive upon him." 235 App. Div. 117,
121, 256 N.Y.S. 628, 632 (2d Dep't 1932).
The defendant in appealing the decision to the court of appeals argued that the judgment
in the action by the administratrix imposed no liability on the insurance company. Neither
did the defendant have any notice in the first action that the insurance company would
make a claim, a claim which the insurance company did not possess at that time. The
defendant viewed the appellate division decision as an alarming change in the law: "It will
mean that in every accident case, where more than one person is injured, there need be but
one trial of the issues by one injured party against the wrongdoer, and that judgment will be
res judicata as to all other persons injured in the same accident." Brief for Appellant at 16,
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506 (1932).
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for the carrier in the second action on
the grounds of a right of indemnification provided by the statute. The defendant's obligation
as indemnitor was settled and could not be relitigated. The dissent was disturbed by the
fact that the plaintiff in the second action, the insurance carrier, was not vouched in In the
death action. "[Tihe judgment in the death action has never established the defendant's
liability in this action as defendant has never had a chance to defend himself against the
statutory cause of action." 260 N.Y. 305, 314, 183 N.E. 506, 509 (1932).
124. See Hawley v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry., 242 Iowa 17, 45 N.W.2d 513 (1951).
125. The absentee owner of a vehicle against whom a judgment is rendered based on
liability arising from statutes such as § 388 of the Veh. & Traf. Law has a right of indemnity
against the driver of his vehicle. However, since the owner's automobile liability insurance
covers permitted drivers, the insurance company would in effect be "paying itself." If the
operator has liability insurance there may be some question of adjustment between the two
insurance companies although presumably the owner's insurer would be the primary If not
sole source of payment. If the judgment against the owner exceeds the coverage of his
policy, he has a clear right of indemnification against the driver for the excess.
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The derivative liability exception, encompassing master-servant and
principal-agent relationships, operates where one is subject to liability for
the culpable act of another. Thus, the master who is not at fault himself
is answerable for the negligent act of his servant committed within the
scope of the employment. Generally speaking, both or neither are liable.
The Restatement position' has been that the master may take advantage
only of a prior exoneration of his servant and the servant may not avail
himself of a judgment for his master. 7
The basic formula for this type of case is a first action by one alleging
injuries against another's servant. The servant wins. The defeated plaintiff
then sues the master, whose liability is dependent on the culpability of
the servant. The master may assert the servant's judgment as a defense . 22
These exceptions are not new. Judge Van Devanter writing in 1907
reviewed the venerable history of the derivative liability exception to
mutuality:
One of the earliest cases in which the question arose is Ferrers v. Arden, 2 Cro. Eliz.
668, which was trespass on the case for the conversion of an ox. The defendant pleaded
that in a prior action for the same trespass, prosecuted by the same plaintiffs against
other defendants, the latter had justified in his right and were acquitted, and it was
held that, if the second action was for the same cause, the defendant's plea was good;
for "although he be a stranger to the record, whereby the plaintiffs were barred, yet
he is privy to the trespass, wherefore he well may plead it, and take advantage of it."
In another relation, the same question arose in Biggs v. Benger, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1372,
an action of trespass against two defendants. One made default, and the other pleaded
that the act charged was done by him in the right of his codefendant and under the
license of the plaintiff. The latter took issue on the plea, which was found against him,
and it was held that the defendant who made default was entitled, on motion in arrest,
to the benefit of the plea because it showed that the plaintiff could have no cause of
action against him. . . .A leading case in this country is Emery v. Fowler, 39 Ate.
326, 63 Am. Dec. 627, which was trespass quare clausum against one who had acted
under the direction of his father. In a prior action by the plaintiff against the father
for the same act the father, who admitted that the son acted under his direction, had
been acquitted, and it was held that the son was entitled to the benefit of that
adjudication. We quote from the opinion: "To permit a person to commence an
action against the principal and to prove the acts alleged to be trespasses, to have
126. Restatement of Judgments § 96 (1942). The Elder case is in accord with this
position. Some cases have permitted the primary actor to take advantage of a judgment for
the derivatively liable party. See, e.g., Wolf v. Kenyon, 242 App. Div. 116, 273 N.Y.S. 170
(3d Dep't 1934); Bishop v. Downs, 18 App. Div. 2d 1127, 239 N.Y.S.2d 529 (4th Dep't
1963) (mem.); Planty v. Potter-DeWitt Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 401, 279 N.Y.S.2d 938
(3d Dep't 1967). See generally Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judg-
ments, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 301 (1961).
127. Applying the analogy to the owner and driver in a motor vehicle accident case, the
absentee owner has been permitted to assert defensively against a former party the judg-
ment for his driver. Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E2d
758 (1937); Byrne v. Hasher, 275 N.Y. 474, 11 N.E.2d 304 (1937) (mem.).
128. Restatement of Judgments § 96 (1942).
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been committed by his servant acting by his order, and to fail upon the merits to
recover, and subsequently to commence an action against that servant and to prove
and rely upon the same acts as a trespass, is to allow him to have two trials for the
same cause of action, to be proved by the same testimony. In such cases the technical
rule that a judgment can only be admitted between the parties to the record or their
privies expands so far as to admit it, when the same question has been decided and
judgment rendered between parties responsible for the acts of others.' u2 9
The third exception to mutuality is based on an identity of issues. The
former adjudication speaks conclusively upon the very issue raised in the
second action. Such identity of issues is a prerequisite to collateral estop-
pel and it seems, therefore, inaccurate to categorize it as an exception.
What is exceptional, however, is the reliance upon identity of issues alone
without the additional presence of privity, indemnity or derivative liabil-
ity. This special type of case will be discussed later.13  Here, attention is
focused on decisions based on a conjunction of identity of issues and
derivative liability and the contrapuntal effect of the shield-sword doctrine.
Haverhill v. International Railway'' reigned virtually unchallenged as
the controlling decision in New York for many years. D1 sued 02182 for
personal injuries and won. Thereupon 01 sued 02 for property damage
and obtained a directed verdict on the grounds that the negligence of the
defendant and the freedom of negligence of D1 had been adjudicated. The
appellate division reversed.'33 Since no privity existed between 01 and
D1, there was no mutuality; furthermore, the plea could not be asserted
affirmatively against a former defendant. Had the first judgment gone
against the driver, 02 could not have employed his victory offensively in
a suit against 01. The latter did not control the first action; he did not
have his day in court.
Thus, one who could not be disadvantaged by another's adverse judg-
ment might not as a plaintiff seek the benefit of another's favorable
judgment against a former defendant. In a derivative case, the mutuality
129. Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 158 F. 63, 66 (8th Cir.
1907).
130. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
131. 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mer., 244 N.Y. 582, 155
N.E. 905 (1927).
132. In the diagrammatic representations employed all parties owning, driving, occupying
as passengers or insuring the first car will be represented by the postscript "i"; those
associated with the second car will bear the postscript "2," etc. The alphabetical designations
will be "0" for owner, "D" for driver, "P" for passenger and "Ir" for insurer. The symbol
"J/" represents "judgment for." The Roman numerals "I" and "II" will indicate the first
action and the second action respectively. Thus:
I. 01 v. 02 - J/01
means that in the first action the owner of the first car sued the owner of the second car
and judgment was rendered for the former.
133. 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522 (4th Dep't 1926).
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rule could be relaxed only where the directly liable party was exonerated
in a first action and the same plaintiff next sued the derivatively liable
party. As a defendant in the second action, the derivatively liable party
was permitted to employ collateral estoppel as a shield to protect himself
from liability without the right of indemnity.
Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery' 4 did not overturn the
Haverhill rule but introduced one modification. In Good Health, the issues
were the negligence and contributory negligence of both drivers. D1 sued
02 and D2 and recovered judgment. 3 5 02 and D2 then sued 01 (absentee
owner) and D 1.136 D1 could avail himself of collateral estoppel since he
was a party to the first action. 01, the court of appeals held, could benefit
by the former judgment even though she was not a party or privy to that
judgment since her liability, if any, was derived solely from the acts of
her driver and he had been adjudicated free of fault. Note that in this
case defensive use is made of collateral estoppel against former defendants
and that the judgment relied on exonerated the primary actor.
In Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Exprcss'I3 the issue was
whether Elder, driver of the truck owned by the United States Trucking
Corporation, could avail himself as plaintiff of a judgment for his em-
ployer arising out of a consolidated action in which each owner had
claimed against the other. The appellate division relying on Good Health,
permitted the plea, 3' finding that the same defendant had had full
opportunity to litigate the determinative issues of negligence and con-
tributory negligence adjudicated at the trial. The appellate division's
reasoning was as follows:
The basis of the holding in the Good Health case was that the one against whom
the rule was sought to be enforced had had his day in court on the same issues and
should not be permitted to relitigate them. There appears to us to be no good reason
for applying the rule in favor of the person represented (Mrs. Emery in the Good
Health case) whose liability was derivative, and refusing to apply it in favor of the
driver (plaintiff in this case) whose negligence or freedom from negligence . . . solely
determined his employer's liability.' 3 9
The court of appeals reversed.4 0 While recognizing the Good Health
decision as a means of avoiding inconsistency in or destruction of the
right of indemnification between an exonerated driver and a liable owner,
134. 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E2d 758 (1937).
135. See Appendix, p. 48 infra.
136. The counterclaim of 01 against 02 and D2 for property damage is omitted for the
sake of simplicity.
137. 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
138. 259 App. Div. 380, 19 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ist Dep't 1940).
139. Id. at 383, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
140. 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
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the court combined the Good Health facts (driver exonerated first) and
the Haverhill rule (defensive use only against a former plaintiff) and
denied the plea of collateral estoppel.
Two examples of a combination of privity and identity of issues as a
basis for departure from strict mutuality are Bernhard v. Bank of Amer-
ica141 and United Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Saeli.142 In Bernhard the
defendant seeking to take advantage of the prior judgment was not a
party to the first action, and the plaintiff sued in what appeared to be a
different capacity in the former proceeding from her role in the subsequent
action. The court ruled that collateral estoppel could be asserted against
the plaintiff since, as beneficiary in the first action and administratrix in
the second, she was in reality the same party in both. Identity of issues
being present, the use of collateral estoppel by a defendant who would
not have been bound to his disadvantage by a former judgment was
permissible so long as the one estopped was a party or privy to the prior
adjudication.
In the second case, Saeli (D2) sued Olney and Carpenter Corporation
(01) and Carpenter (D1) for personal injury and property damage
arising out of a collision. D1 then instituted suit against D2 for personal
injuries. The two actions were ordered tried together. Each driver alleged
his freedom from contributory negligence and the other's negligence.
The jury brought in a verdict of no cause of action in the claim of D2;
judgment was entered in favor of 01 and D1. In Dl's claim against D2,
the judgment was for D1. The insurer of 01 had paid for the damage to
the car under a fifty dollar deductible policy, and was subrogated to 01's
claim against D2. The third litigation therefore was the insurer's and
owner's action for property damage. Special term granted, and the fourth
department affirmed.. judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiffs.
The entire case may be depicted as follows:
I. D2 v. O1, D1 - J/01, D1
II. D1 v. D2 - J/D1
III. Irl, 01 v. D2 - Irl and 01 may use
J/01, D1 and J/D1.
Had only I been tried without II, the verdict in favor of 01 and Dl
might have been predicated on the negligence of both drivers, Carpenter
and Saeli. "However, tried before the same judge, and with the same jury,
was Carpenter's action, in which he sought a recovery for personal injuries
141. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
142. 272 App. Div. 951, 71 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 611, 75
N.E.2d 626 (1947).
143. 272 App. Div. 951, 71 N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't 1947).
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from Saeli growing out of this same collision. The jury's verdict in Car-
penter's favor necessarily determined that Saeli was the sole one at fault
for the collision. Since all three were parties to this single trial, took part
in it, and since the same evidence furnished the basis for the jury's find-
ings in each action, it seems almost sophistry to say that . . . it was
not. .. forever determined, . . . that the one solely to blame . . . was
Saeli.'
Several aspects of this decision are worthy of note. Offensive use of
collateral estoppel was permitted against a former plaintiff-defendant; one
of the parties invoking it was not a party to the first action. How might
the insurer be classified?145 Does the court treat him as a privy'40 although
not in privity? 147
The status of the plaintiff had importance since New York law in 1947
did not recognize as an exception to mutuality non-party, offensive use of
collateral estoppel. No problem existed as to the status of the person
against whom the plea was raised since he was a plaintiff in I and a
defendant in II and III, that is, unless one relies more on the reservations
expressed in Elder than the holding of Good Health. If there is privity,24 8
there is nothing extraordinary about Saeli; if privity is lacking, Saeli
resembles BR. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall'1 but without the aid of derivative
liability.
The last major case to be considered in the development of exceptions
to mutuality antedating DeWitt 50 is Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.15' Unlike
the others, it is not a negligence case arising out of a motor vehicle
accident.
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, sued another real estate broker for one-
half of a commission received by the latter upon the sale of property to
one Gross. Plaintiff alleged a first cause of action against the broker for
breach of a written agreement to share the commission if the realty in
question were sold to a buyer introduced by plaintiff. A second cause of
144. Id. at 952, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
145. Id. at 952, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
146. J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 98, at ff 5011A0, n.250.
147. F. James, Civil Procedure, 594 (1965).
148. The insurer (Irl) in the Brief for PLlaintiffs-Respondents at 8 describes the relation-
ship between it and Olney & Carpenter (01), in terms of a subrogee or assignee whose
rights were dependent on its subrogor or assignor. As subrogee, it had no individual or
personal rights against D2 but only the rights of its subrogor. The subrogee would have
had no standing in court in the first action since no cause of action had accrued prior to its
payment to the subrogee under the collision policy.
149. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
150. Id.
151. 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.YS.2d 1 (1956).
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action was directed against the purchaser for intentionally inducing the
second broker to breach his contract with the plaintiff. The two causes of
action were severed and the claim against the second broker was tried
first. A jury verdict in that case was set aside and the complaint dismissed
on the ground that the plaintiff had not introduced the purchaser to the
transaction and that the second broker consequently had not violated
the contract.
Plaintiff then proceeded with his action against the purchaser; the latter
pleaded as an affirmative defense the conclusiveness of the judgment in
the first case. Special term denied his motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that defendant Gross, not having been a party or privy to
the first case could not claim the benefit of that judgment as an estoppel.
The appellate division's reversal was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The decision rested on the identity of issues in the two causes of action.
To prove the second cause, plaintiff would have had to show a valid con-
tract between him and the other broker, the purchaser's knowledge of the
contract, a breach, and the purchaser's intentional inducement of the
second broker to breach the contract. Since plaintiff failed to prove a
breach in the first suit, he was barred from relitigating that issue.
The appellate division relied on the reasoning developed in the Restate-
ment of Judgments, section 99, to the effect that a prior judgment "in
favor of a person charged with the commission of a tort or a breach of
contract bars a subsequent action" by the same plaintiff against another
defendant whose liability is based upon inducing the identical tort or
breach of contract. Israel represents a defensive use of collateral estoppel
against a former plaintiff without, however, the additional presence of
privity or derivative liability or indemnity. 2
The first department in Quatroche v. Consolidated Edison Co.' con-
fined Israel to a defensive use of collateral estoppel. Plaintiff, a passenger,
pleaded affirmatively a former judgment for the owner and operator of
her vehicle against the same defendant.' 54 Since the passenger was not a
party in the former adjudication, that judgment "neither precludes the
plaintiff nor establishes the defendant's liability in this action."1 5 But in
Kinney v. State,56 the passengers in the second car employed offensively
152. A case similar to Israel is American Button Co. v. Warsaw Button Co., 31 N.Y.S.2d
395 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd mem., 265 App. Div. 905, 38 N.Y.S.2d 570 (4th Dep't 1942). See
Eissing Chem. Co. v. People's Nat'l Bank, 205 App. Div. 89, 199 N.Y.S. 342 (2d Dep't),
aff'd mem., 237 N.Y. 532, 143 N.E. 731 (1923).
153. 11 App. Div. 2d 665, 201 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1st Dep't 1960).
154. See Appendix, p. 50 infra.
155. 11 App. Div. 2d at 665, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
156. 191 Misc. 128, 75 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
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a prior judgment for the passengers of the first car based on the same
negligent act of the state.
B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,' holds that a derivatively liable absentee
owner of a motor vehicle may plead affirmatively a former judgment
exonerating his driver. The case may be diagrammed as follows:
I. DI v. 02 - J/D1
II. 01 v. 02 - O1 may use J/D1
In the first action, DeWitt's (01's) driver sued for personal injuries
and won. In the second case special term granted 01's motion to strike the
first affirmative defense.. and for summary judgment on the ground that
the applicability of collateral estoppel does not rest upon the fact that
a party has not tried an issue against a particular adversary. Rather, the
controlling factor is identity of issues.16 9
The appellate division reversed, believing itself bound by the ElderC"
and Minkof'6' decisions, and limiting the authority of IsraelV62 to defen-
sive collateral estoppel in the context of identity of issues. The dissent of
Justice Goldman,'63 however, distinguished the factual situation in Minkofl
which involved a subsequent suit between former co-defendants. In the
instant case, 02 was an adversary in Dl's personal injury action with
"full opportunity" to contest the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence. His liability for property damage depended directly on the
same issue. The "absolute" identity of issues'6 4 and the defendant's adver-
sarial participation in Dl's action combined to give him his day in courL'65
The court of appeals in reversing the appellate division announced that
mutuality is dead, and overruled "at least Haverhill!"' Reviewing the
157. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.YS.2d 596 (1967), rev'g mem. 24 App. Div.
2d 831, 264 N.Y.S.2d 68 (4th Dep't 1965).
158. Defendant alleged that 01 had received payment from his insurer under a collision
policy and that the cause of action was thereby assigned to the insurer and 01 was not the
real party in interest.
159. The court cited: Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 1S
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956); United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E2d 625
(1947) (mem.); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758
(1937).
160. 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
161. 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962).
162. 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
163. 24 App. Div. 2d 831, 832, 264 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (4th Dep't 1965) (mem.).
164. 02 contended in his brief that different issues might arise in the property damage
action, e.g., a mechanical defect known to 01 but not to DI, Brief of Defendant-Respondent
at 4, B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S2d 596 (1967).
165. This criterion is ably developed in Brief for Appellant, B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,
19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
166. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.YS.2d 596, 601 (1967).
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trend of recent decisions," 7 Judge Scileppi focused on two considerations:
identity of issues and full opportunity to litigate them in the prior action
by the party against whom the estoppel was sought to be asserted.
In this case, where the issues, as framed by the pleadings, were no broader and no
different than those raised in the first lawsuit; where the defendant here offers no
reason for not holding him to the determination in the first action; where it is
unquestioned (and probably unquestionable) that the first action was defended with
full vigor and opportunity to be heard; and where the plaintiff in the present action,
the owner of the vehicle, derives his right to recovery from the plaintiff in the first
action, the operator of said vehicle, although they do not technically stand in the
relationship of privity, there is no reason either in policy or precedent to hold that
the judgment in the Farnumr case is not conclusive in the present action .... 108
Some of the questions not answered by DeWitt are: may a primary
actor (driver, servant) affirmatively appropriate a judgment for a deriva-
tively liable party (owner, master) against the same defendant? May a
driver or owner offensively assert a judgment for a passenger or a pas-
senger the judgment for a driver, owner or other passengers? May a
bystander affirmatively or defensively use a judgment for an owner, driver
or passenger? Where do Israel and DeWitt lead when there is no privity,
no derivative liability but solely identity of issues and a litigational "priv-
ity" between the judgment winner and a new party seeking to benefit
from that judgment?
Passengers
Passengers heretofore have been a class, sui generis, not invited to
partake at the communal table where judgments are shared. The case
expressing the New York view that a driver may not appropriate a judg-
ment for his passenger to estop a subsequent claim against him is Daly v.
Terpening.69 Terpening (DI) sued Daly (D2) for his own personal
injuries and property damage. He sued D2 also an administrator for the
estate of his wife, a passenger (P1). The actions were tried together and
resulted in a final judgment for P1 in the second action and a final judg-
ment for D2 in the first action. D2 then brought a suit for her personal
injuries and property damage against DI; the latter interposed the de-
167. As a foundation for its holding the court cited: Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105,
218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966); Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d
156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956); United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 625
(1947) (mem.); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758
(1937).
168. 19 N.Y.2d at 148, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02.
169. 261 App. Div. 423, 26 N.Y.S.2d 160 (4th Dep't), aff'd mem., 287 N.Y. 611, 39
N.E.2d 260 (1941).
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fense of "res judicata." The plea was denied. The case may be represented
thus:
I. D1 v. D2 - J/D2
II. P1 (by DI) v. D2 - J/PI
III. D2 v. D1 - D1 may not use J/P1
The court reasoned as follows:
The positions of the driver and the passenger in the automobile are different and quite
often the passenger and driver differ not only in knowledge of the operation of the
car [but] . . . in appreciation of the conduct of other drivers in their then traffic ....
Mrs. Daly may have given some signal . .. that would have advised the driver of
the other car of the manner in which she intended to operate her car, and insofar as
that driver is concerned the conduct of Mrs. Daly would not necessarily be negli-
gence ... and yet such conduct or action unknown or unappreciated by the passenger
would result in a situation in which the operation of the car by Mrs. Daly would be
causative negligence insofar as the passenger. . . was concerned.'1 0
The court observed that there was no mutuality of estoppel. The parties
in II and III were not the same; in the third action, D1 appeared in his
individual capacity, while in the second action he was acting as adminis-
trator of his wife's estate. And of course, no privity existed between D1
(husband) and P1 (wife).
In an earlier case 71 the driver did not attempt to use his passenger's
judgment but rather his own prior judgment obtained against the owner
of the other vehicle. The case can be represented in this way:
I. 01 v. 02 - J/0D1
II. P2 v. ODI, 02 - OD1 may not use J/OD1
Although in I the owner-driver proved that the accident was caused
solely by the negligence of 02's driver, P2 was free to prove in the second
case that OD1 was negligent as to her.Y7 Thus, the passenger was not
precluded from suing the formerly exonerated driver as well as the cul-
pable bus owner, 02. The freedom from negligence of the first driver
vis-a-vis the second driver did not establish the former's freedom from
negligence vis-h-vis the passenger of the second driver.173
170. 261 App. Div. 423, 426-27, 26 N.YS.2d 160, 163-64 (4th Dep't 1941).
171. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
172. Id. at 164, 184 N.E. at 746.
173. Sullivan v. Gist, 159 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Pa. 1958) involved passengers in both cars,
as well as drivers and owner. Diagrammed it reads:
I. D1 v. D2-J/D1,
II. P1 v. 01, D2 - J/P1 against D2 only
IL P2 v. D2
D2 impleaded 01 - 01 may use J/D1
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Whether as a projection of Cummings v. Dresher1 74 the passengers and
driver of one vehicle will be permitted greater freedom in sharing each
other's judgments is conjecturalY.7 5 Perhaps the burden will be placed on
the party opposing collateral estoppel to prove that he exercised different
degrees of care as to his counterpart driver and that driver's passenger.
Whether the passenger or driver of the first car may offensively or de-
fensively use a prior judgment against a passenger or driver of the second
car is even more complex and speculative. Even assuming that Daly has
been overruled sub silentio by Cummings, the courts may not be willing
to go that far.
A second type of situation involving the borrowing of a judgment by
one not in privity and not in a derivative relationship to a participant in
the former adjudication is the multiple passenger case."' New York has
thus far not permitted a passenger to assert a former judgment for a
fellow passenger against the same defendant.
77
However, a recent case of considerable magnitude, United States v.
United Air Lines, Inc.' may portend a modification of New York law.
The litigation arose out of a collision of a United Air Lines plane with a
military jet in Nevada killing all passengers and crew members. Suits were
filed in eleven jurisdictions in the United States. Twenty-four suits by
survivors-heirs were filed in the Southern District of California, seven in
Nevada and one in the Eastern District of Washington. All of the cases
filed in the Southern District of California were consolidated for trial. A
jury verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs on the issue of negligence. The
plaintiffs in Nevada and Washington first moved for a transfer to the
Southern District of California, and subsequently for summary judgment
on the issue of liability. Thus, the plaintiffs who were not parties or privies
174. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
175. See discussion p. 37 infra.
176. See 35 Yale L.J. 607, 612 (1926).
177. Bisnoff v. Herrmann, 260 App. Div. 663, 23 N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d Dep't. 1940). The
court took the occasion to state the law respecting derivative liability and mutuality as of
1940: "Where, as here, there is no privity or relationship approximating privity, a judgment
cannot be res judicata, even as a defense, in favor of one who was not a party and who
would have not been bound had the judgment been adverse." Id. at 666, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
178. 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962), modified, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
379 U.S. 951 (1964). See also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 934 (1964). The court's construction of a labor contract and defendant's
liability under it inured to the benefit of the second group of plaintiff-employees (not
parties to the first action) against the same defendant. The Zdanok (first) suit involved
5 employees suing for seniority rights; the Alexander (second) suit (pending in state court)
involved 160 employees. After defendant's liability was established on the first Zdanok
appeal and the case remanded to the district court for assessment of damages, the Alexander
state action was dropped, re-instituted in federal district court and consolidated with
Zdanok.
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in the California case sought to assert that judgment affirmatively against
the same defendant. Obviously mutuality was lacking. The court adopted
the test of Bernhard v. Bank of America:Th Was the issue identical? Was
there a final judgment on the merits? Was the prior judgment asserted
against a party or privy to that judgment? The court answered all three
questions in the affirmative.'
The court considered the following additional aspects of the case. The
California litigation'' involved the major part of the total liability of
United Air Lines to survivors of the passengers, the judgments in that
case amounting to over two million dollars. Thus, defendant was alerted
to the full potentialities of the controversy and had every incentive to
prepare and try the case with the utmost skill.
The court described the thoroughness of the proceedings:
a) Depositions were taken throughout the country.
b) Many hundreds of interrogatories were submitted by the parties
to each other.
c) Pre-trial proceedings consumed eight days terminating in an order
19 pages in length.
d) Of the 69 trial days, but three were devoted to the plaintiff's direct
case.
e) Summations to the jury occupied four days.
f) Instructions to the jury were argued for seven days. 82
The court concluded that the defendant was collaterally estopped by
virtue of the judgments in the California cases to deny the liability to
plaintiffs in this case.' Since the defendant had "participated in a full,
fair adversary proceeding and has had a full opportunity to present its
case and has fully presented its case in the Wiener trial on liability,"
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel did not apply.8 4
It may be argued that the United Air Lines decision should be limited
to catastrophic cases of this kind' where the instantaneous deaths of all
passengers could scarcely permit a measuring of different degrees of fault
to each. The court was impressed by the completeness and the fairness of
the opportunity of the defendant to interpose every possible fact or
179. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
180. 216 F. Supp. at 727-32.
181. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), aff'g 237 F. Supp. 90
(S.D. Cal. 1964).
182. 216 F. Supp. at 730-31.
183. Id. at 731.
184. United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 731.
185. But see Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
1967]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
inference in its favor. Thus the determination did not rest on any super-
ficial application of the Bernhard formula. But in applying the criteria
which have supplanted mutuality the court emphasized the due process
requirement of a full day in court.
Issues
The discussion thus far has utilized the term "identity of issues" with-
out refinement of analysis. The recent cases examined in the text illustrate
the increasingly important role assigned to the identity factor, as restric-
tions embodied in mutuality have been relaxed and abandoned. The stan-
dard formulation of the rule is that issues must be (a) identical, (b) actu-
ally litigated and (c) necessarily determined. Possibly the most difficult
aspect is the first, since this must be concerned, more fundamentally than
the others, with the question: What is an issue? Is it an ultimate fact or
may it, in some cases, constitute evidentiary findings of ultimate signifi-
cance? Hinchey v. Sellers'8" reviewed subsequently focuses on identity
of issues.
That preclusionary effect attaches only to questions adversarially con-
tested is an incident of collateral estoppel, 87 dictated by the potentialities
of abuse inherent in the doctrine. The effect of a failure to deny an
allegation of the complaint or of an express admission of some or all allega-
tions in the pleadings has been generally confined to the particular case.' 8
It is not so clear whether an issue is actually litigated if it is put in issue
by the pleadings and later admitted, or a stipulation is entered into by the
parties so that no proof is submitted on that fact. In determining what is
actually litigated, reference will often be necessary to the record of the
prior case and perhaps even to matters outside the record.
A judgment based upon the consent of the parties rather than a trial
of the facts produces no actually litigated issues. Yet in New York, such
a judgment is generally given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect.189
The same conclusion, that no issues have been litigated, is obviously
applicable to judgments by default. It is logical to accord such judgments
186. 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
187. See Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 52-53 (1897); Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876) ; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty
Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929); Restatement of Judgments § 68,
comments a, c, d (1942); 2 Freeman § 677 (5th ed. 1925); Note, Collateral Estoppel by
Judgment, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 647 (1952).
188. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3123(b); Restatement of Judgments § 68, comments f, g (1942).
189. 5 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice at 11 5011.31. But see
General Analine & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d 844 (1953). A decision
rendered but not entered (the parties having settled in the interim) was hold to be not
res judicata. Mandracchia v. Russo, 53 Misc. 2d 1018, 280 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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bar and merger effect. To permit a default judgment potentially more
pervasive sequelae through issue binding, however, is a more serious due
process problem than some of the others which have engaged the attention
of the courts in this area. All that the defendant may be admitting by his
default is that he would rather pay a small claim, or seek to elude the
enforcement of a claim, than submit to a trial.
The criterion of actual litigation has become entangled in the confusion
surrounding identical causes of action. While in many cases, such as the
multiple stages of a marital dispute or a complex will or contract, it may
be an intricate matter to determine what facts were actually litigated,
this is not the case in the usual motor vehicle accident in which the
ultimate facts are negligence, contributory negligence, permission and
proximate cause." There is, therefore, less mystery concerning what is
actually litigated in the typical accident case, and the actually litigated
rule ought to be sensibly applied without hypertechnicalities. The actual
litigation requirement has not been strictly adhered to in New York. 1'
The criterion that an issue must have been necessarily determined in
the first action to possess potentially binding effect in the second action
may cause more difficulties in accident cases. 1 2 The problem arises where
judgment is for the defendant upon a general verdict. Matters found
against the winning party are not matters on which the judgment neces-
sarily depends and are, of course, not appealable.193 It is not a particularly
helpful definition to state that the necessarily determined issue must be
a material fact and that an estoppel will not operate as to facts on which
the judgment did not depend. It is apparent that in many types of cases
adherence to the "necessarily determined rule" is essential to prevent
cutting off rights which the party in the first action had no intention of
putting at stake. The approach expressed in the following passage is
especially germane to accident litigation:
But there is a difference between a finding or adjudication which is immaterial and
one which is material, though perhaps unnecessary in view of other findings. The
mere fact that the court goes further than is absolutely necessary to sustain its
judgment in determining material issues presented to it does not prevent such issues
from becoming res judicata .... All that is necessary is that the point or matter
in question, if a material one, should have been actually considered and determined.'0
190. For a variable approach to what is the same cause of action see W. E. Hedger
Transp. Corp. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 92 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), afi'd, 186 F.2d
236 (2d Cir. 1951); Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y2d 688, 143 N.E.2d 10, 153 N.Y.S.2d 13
(1957).
191. Note, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158, 1172-76 (1961).
192. See pp. 37-42 infra.
193. 2 Freeman, supra note 187, at § 697.
194. 2 Freeman, supra note 187, at § 698. It is also stated in this passage that "one who
claims a finding was not material to the issues has the burden of sho%%ing it." Id.
1967]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
It may be that the law of New York is tending towards acceptance of,
for collateral estoppel purposes, either issues actually litigated or issues
necessarily determined (in the narrow sense) as binding upon a subse-
quent cause of action.
Cutting across both the "identity" and "necessarily determined" pre-
requisites is the evasive distinction between ultimate and evidentiary fact.
Judge Learned Hand in The Evergreens v. Nunan96 is the recent source
for the evidentiary-ultimate fact demarcation'96 in the context of the New
York "rule" that only ultimate facts may have conclusive effect in subse-
quent litigation. The opinion defines an ultimate fact as "one of those
facts, upon whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty, or the
right, in question."' 97 "Mediate datum" (evidentiary fact), on the other
hand, it defines as the basis for a rational inference of ultimate fact.
But whether the fact in the first proceeding is ultimate or mediate
matters little according to the theory developed in the opinion. Such
proposition to be conclusive in subsequent lawsuits must have been "neces-
sary to the result" in the first suit.198 A caveat is issued in applying this
guide. Since it is impossible to anticipate the future significance of facts,
it is unduly harsh, according to Judge Hand, to give binding effect to
every fact decided in a prior case between the parties, even though their
determination was essential to the decision.' 99
What seems to be of more moment than the classification assigned to
the projected proposition is the category of fact it acts upon in the second
lawsuit. In Judge Hand's view, neither an ultimate nor an evidentiary fact
in the first case may establish mediate data in the second. 200
Two multi-stage New York cases illustrate the difficulties attending
application of the issues requirements in determining owner's liability.20 1
Fox v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.202 considered the following
question: Is a prior adjudication that the operation of a car was without
the owner's permission, as the statute has been construed by the courts,
195. 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
196. Earlier references are to "matters in issue" rather than to ultimate fact. The
matters in issue are the essential elments of a cause of action or defense which must be
pleaded; they are distinguished from matters which are merely to be proved, or are in
controversy in the evidence. See 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 522, 523 (1961).
197. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 929.
200. In prior litigation, the fair market value of petitioner's fully improved land was
decided. In the instant controversy, the government refused to be guided by that determina-
tion in assessing the fair market value of petitioner's partially improved land, 47 B.T.A.
815 (1942).
201. For discussion of the issue of permission in single-stage litigation see pp. 4-11 supra.
202. 239 App. Div. 671, 268 N.Y.S. 536 (4th Dep't 1934).
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decisive on the issue of permission as defined in the coverage clause of an
insurance policy? Applying the statutory standard0 3 in the first Fox
case,20 the court determined that only the defendant driver could be held
for injuries to the plaintiffs, since his use of a city car on this occasion
was without permission.
When the execution issued against the defendant was returned unsatis-
fied, plaintiffs sued the city's insurance carrier.205 The latter pleaded the
first judgment as res judicata on the issue of permission. The court did
not permit the plea; it reasoned that absence of statutory consent did not
determine absence of permission by the terms of the insurance policy-
That question involved the intendment of the contracting parties and the
scope of the coverage. In other words, the facts did not warrant imposition
upon the owner (the city) of statutory liability for its negligent driver;
but in a contract action to construe the liability insurance policy, the same
facts might or might not accord with "permission"20 as defined by the
coverage clause. Therefore, all of the facts had to be presented anew in
a second trial..2
0 7
The various stages of litigation in Hinchcy v. SellersOs pertain to the
liabilities of the driver, owner and insurer of a car which left the road
near Sennett, New York, resulting in the death of the two passengers. The
car was owned by Orville Sellers, a resident of Pennsylvania and insured
under a liability policy issued in Pennsylvania. Sellers had turned the car
over to his son, Donald, for use at his station, Sampson Air Force Base.
The son had, on previous occasions, taken other service men as passengers
in his car and loaned his car to others to drive.
On this particular occasion, one of the prospective passengers had re-
quested the use of the car to drive to the State Fair at Syracuse. Donald
refused upon learning that one O'Rourke was to accompany them.2 9 The
203. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 59 (now N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388).
204. Fox v. City of Syracuse, 231 App. Div. 273, 247 N.Y.S. 429 (4th Dep't 1931), afi'd,
258 N.Y. 550, 180 N.E. 328 (1931).
205. 239 App. Div. 671, 268 N.YS. 536 (4th Dep't 1934).
206. Id. at 672-74, 268 N.Y.S. at 538-40.
207. At the second trial, based on essentially the same facts adduced at the first trial, the
court held the insurer was not liable for payment to the plaintiffs on account of the driver's
negligence, since the latter's use was not permitted within the terms of the insurance con-
tract. 239 App. Div. 671, 268 N.Y.S. 536 (4th Dep't 1934).
208. Hinchey v. Sellers, 1 M,isc. 2d 711, 147 N.YS.2d 893 (Sup. CL 1955), rev'd, 5
App. Div. 2d 440, 172 N.Y.S.2d 47 (4th Dep't), reargument denied, 6 App. Div. 2d 757,
174 N.YS.2d 455 (4th Dep't 1958), rev'd, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1959).
209. The refusal was not based on O'Rourke's incompetence as a driver; Donald testified
to the contrary. Proceedings in New Hampshire, Record at 89. Rather, he refused because
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passenger thereupon assured Donald that O'Rourke would not make the
trip and, owing to this assurance, Donald transferred the car keys to the
passenger. O'Rourke not only joined the excursion but was at the wheel
when the fatal accident occurred.
The administrators of the two passengers instituted negligence actions
against O'Rourke in New Hampshire, the state of his residence; the in-
surer refused to defend on the ground that the car was being used without
permission of the owner. The administrators then petitioned the New
Hampshire court for a declaratory judgment to establish that the car was
driven with the owner's permission and that the insurer was liable under
the policy issued to the owner. The issues were heard by the court with-
out a jury. The superior court made a detailed statement of findings in-
cluding these crucial facts: Donald gave permission on condition that
O'Rourke would not be a passenger; Donald did not have knowledge of
the violation of the condition until informed of the accident.
The superior court transferred the case to the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire certifying four questions of law: (1) Was the coverage of the
liability insurance to be determined by New York or Pennsylvania Law?
(2) Was the use of the car with permission of the insured? (3) Was the
defendant insurer obligated to cover the driver under the policy? (4) Was
the insurer obligated to pay claims or defend actions resulting from the
accident?...
The supreme court held that Pennsylvania law governed the interpreta-
tion of the terms of the policy, which limited coverage to the named in-
sured and "to any person while using the automobile . . . provided the
actual use. .. is by the named insured or with his permission." '
In view of the superior court's findings that permission was conditioned
on O'Rourke's absence, the car at the time of the accident was "neither
actually nor impliedly [used] within the limits of the permission granted
by Sellers ... . ,1212 The use was non-permissive within the meaning of the
terms of the liability policy. Therefore, the insurer was not obligated to
provide coverage to the driver or to pay claims arising from the accident.
The superior court entered a decree in conformance with the supreme
court's rulings.
The administrators voluntarily discontinued the tort actions in New
O'Rourke was limited to the base as a result of an infraction of rules, and Donald feared
he might be court-martialed if he assisted O'Rourke in voliating the restriction. Id. at 105.
210. Hinchey v. National Sur. Co., 99 N.H. 373, 376, 111 A.2d 827, 830 (1955).
211. Since the father had transferred the car to Donald under a "broad authority,"
"anyone driving with Donald's permission was also driving with the permission of the .
named insured." Id. at 377, 111 A.2d at 830.
212. Id at 379, 111 A.2d at 831. The court distinguished the factual situation from
Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 179 N.E. 389 (1932).
L[Vol. 3 6
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Hampshire against O'Rourke, and instituted suit against Orville and
Donald Sellers in the Supreme Court of New York. 13 Defendants alleged
as a defense the New Hampshire declaratory judgment for the insurer
and moved for summary judgment. The court found that the same de-
termination-that permission was granted on condition that O'Rourke
not be a passenger-would bar plaintiff's recovery against the owner
under New York law214 as it had barred plaintiff's recovery against the
insurer. Plaintiff having had a complete trial in New Hampshire on the
issue of permissive use "should not now have a second opportunity to
establish the same facts they failed to prove the first time. ' 21 5 The judg-
ment for the indemnitor could be asserted by the indemnitee.
The fourth department reversed 216 on the ground that collateral es-
toppel was not available in the absence of identity of issues. The issue
in the New Hampshire proceedings, noted Justice Halpern, was permis-
sive use under the terms of the liability insurance and rested on the
intent of the parties. In the instant action, permissive use was to be de-
termined in accordance with the intent of the legislature as expressed in
section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Since the ultimate fact of
permission was not identical, plaintiffs were not estopped from "relitigating
the underlying evidentiary questions bearing upon the ultimate issue
of... permission....,- 7 The conflicts of laws problem was disposed of in
two steps: a determination that New Hampshire law controlled the effect
to be given evidentiary findings, followed by a determination that New
Hampshire law was substantially the same as New York on this point.
The court of appeals, reversing, did not supply a guide for distinguish-
ing ultimate fact from evidentiary fact.21 The finding in the New Hamp-
shire case that the permission was predicated on O'Rourke's not being
a passenger "was not a fragmentary finding of an evidentiary fact" but
one "from which the resolution of the ultimate legal issue necessarily
followed. ' 219 Although the ultimate issue was different in New York,
the same conclusion of non-permissive use would flow from a retrial of
all of the same operative facts. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
had concluded that the findings of a specifically conditioned permission
213. 1 Misc. 2d 711, 147 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1955), revd, 5 App. Div. 2d 440, 172
N.Y.S.2d 47 (4th dep't 1958), rev'd, 7 N.Y.2d 87, 165 N.E2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
214. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 59 (now N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388).
215. 1 Misc. 2d at 716, 147 N.YS.2d at 898.
216. 5 App. Div. 2d 440, 172 N.Y.S.2d 47 (4th Dep't 1958), rev'd, 7 N.Y2d 287, 165
N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
217. Id. at 447, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 54. The court refers to The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141
F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
218. 7 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 165 N.E.2d 156, 159, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1959).
219. Id.
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was "unquestionably warranted by the evidence." 2 0 The terms of the
permission having been fully litigated, firmly established and necessary
to the former decision for the indemnitor, the plaintiffs were estopped
from relitigating the same facts in their action against the indemnitee.
If one adopts the definition that an evidentiary fact is a "proposition
to which no legal consequences immediately attach"2 21 but "affords some
logical basis-not conclusive-for inferring some other fact 2 2 2 and that
a statement of ultimate fact "describes the very event to which legal
consequences attach,"12a then the presence or absence of permission was
an ultimate fact in Hinchey and the testimony establishing the terms of
use constituted evidentiary fact.
2 2 4
Hinchey appears to hold that facts necessary to the result may be con-
clusive in a later claim between parties or their privies even though the
facts are not ultimate in the first action. Hinchey, however, involves a
situation in which all of the evidentiary facts necessary to prove the
ultimate fact in the New Hampshire action were also necessary to prove
the ultimate fact in the New York suit.
2 25
Certainly the evidentiary facts supporting a finding of permission or
the absence of permission are vital enough under statutes similar to New
York's section 388 and under the common coverage clauses of liability
policies to warrant the most scrupulous attention of counsel in a vehicle
accident case. If, therefore, the exact nature of the permission is settled
in an earlier-tried cause of action against the indemnitee or indemnitor,
according such facts estoppel effect should not occasion cries of surprise
that one is bound on a collateral matter he did not contest vigorously. 2 0
Ownership of a vehicle and the conditions attached to permission are
220. Hinchey v. National Sur. Co., 99 N.H. 373, 378, 111 A.2d 827, 831 (1955).
221. Morris, Law and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1326 (1942).
222. W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 34 (1920).
223. Morris, supra note 221, at 1326.
224. "The distinction between propositions of fact and conclusions of law is that:
propositions of fact are descriptive; conclusions of law are dispositive. Propositions of fact
state history; conclusions of law assign legal significance to that history." Morris, supra note
221, at 1329. Brief for Defendants-Appellants (the Sellerses) at 40 suggests that three steps
are involved in issue determination: (1) a finding of evidentiary facts, (2) a finding of
ultimate facts and (3) application of the law to the ultimate facts producing a decision on
the ultimate issue. The New Hampshire court reached a finding of ultimate fact-no
permission. The Appellants contended that the New York court had only to apply New
York law to the ultimate facts to reach a conclusion as to permission under N.Y. Veh. &
Traf. Law § 59 (now N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388).
225. Restatement of Judgments § 69, comment p (1942 and 1948 Supp.); for New
York recognition of the estoppel effect of a Virginia judgment, see Peare v. Griggs, 7 App.
Div. 2d 303, 182 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1st Dep't 1959).
226. Permission is a "matter in issue," an essential element of the cause of action and
is not collateral or incidental. 2 Freeman, supra note 187, at §§ 690, 691.
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examples of important evidentiary facts which are necessary antecedents
to a determination of liability. Once fairly tried and decided they should
be available to the proper parties in a subsequent case.2 2
The effort to formulate a comprehensible distinction between evidenti-
ary and ultimate facts has not been fruitful. This differentiation may
affect either the identity of issues requirement and/or the necessarily
determined rule. Perhaps there is too much variation in the degrees of
importance attributable to different categories of evidentiary fact ranging
from the almost irrelevant detail to the almost singly decisive proposition.
In a case such as Hinehey, where the absentee owner is sued, ownership
of the vehicle, permission to another to use the vehicle, the driver's
negligence and its causal relation to the plaintiff's injury are all indis-
pensable steps to a final judgment of liability or no liability. Conse-
quently, the approach of the court of appeals should be followed, and
estoppel effect should be accorded the determination of the factual basis
of permission once it has been fully tried.
Cummings v. Dresher
The case of Cummings v. Dresher 2  presents at once the thorniest
problems of collateral estoppel: the actually litigated, necessarily de-
termined issue,2 -9 the identity of issues and the relationship of parties
invoking or contesting the binding effect of a prior adjudication.
The state court action instituted by the driver (D2) and owner (02)
of the Cummings car (car 2) against the driver (Dl) and owner (01)
of the Dresher car (car 1)' 9 was preceded by two law suits against the
Cummingses in federal district court,"1 in which the plaintiffs were D1
and his passenger (Pl). 23 D1 and P1 sued individually for personal
227. See New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 493,
63 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1945).
228. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966); see Note, 52 Cornell L.Q.
724 (1967); 35 Fordham L. Rev. 559 (1967).
229. The issue of permission was absent from the case, it being conceded that Bernard
Dresher operated car 1 with the permission of the owner, Standard Electric Co., although
not at the time on the business of the corporate owner, and that Mary Cummings operated
car 2 with the permission of the owner, Martin Cummings, her husband.
230. 43 Misc. 2d 556, 251 N.YS.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd mem., 24 App. Div. 2d 912,
264 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d Dep't 1965), rev'd, 18 N.Y..2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.YS.2d 976
(1966).
231. 325 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1963). Since the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 and
since the Dreshers were residents of Montreal and the Cummingses residents of New
York, jurisdiction was based on diversity.
232. Another member of the Dresher family, a passenger in the back seat of car 1,
escaped injury and appeared as witness for Bernard Dresher corroborating his version of
the accident.
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injuries; the cases were tried before the same district judge and jury but
were not consolidated.
Testimony adduced at the trial of the Dl's and P1's claims exhibited
sharp conflicts over the facts of the collision.2 3 Each driver vigorously
contended his own freedom from negligence and the other's lack of due
care. In his charge, District Judge Foley instructed the jury to consider
the two causes of action separately. 3 4 He also explained to the jury that
the passenger (P1) might recover if he was not negligent even though the
driver (D1) was found negligent.3 5 At the end of the charge, the judge
again cautioned the jury: "Keep your verdicts sel5arate . . . . Consider
the evidence separately as to each of the plaintiffs .... 1,23"
The district court jury rendered a verdict for P1 in his action against
02 and D2. But in Dl's suit, the jury responded: "We find the defendant
[D2] guilty of negligence and the plaintiff [D1] guilty of contributory
negligence to a very minor degree."2 7 The court requested the clerk to
ask the jury if their decision was no cause of action in favor of 02 and
D2, and the jury replied affirmatively.2 13 D1 unsuccessfully appealed the
decision rendered against him.3 9 02 and D2 did not appeal from the
judgment for P1.
In the New York Supreme Court proceedings commenced in 1961, 02
and D2 alleged three causes of action against D1 and 01 for property
damage, personal injury and loss of services against D I and the corporate
owner of car 1. The various stages of the litigation may be depicted as
follows:
I. P1 v. 02, D2 - J/P1
II. D1 v. 02, D2 - J/02, D2
III. 02, D2 v. 01, Dl
As a complete defense in the third lawsuit, D1 offered the prior ad-
judication of the negligence of the driver of car 2, and moved for sum-
mary judgment. In denying the motion, Justice Main concluded that the
prior decision in favor of the passenger of car 1 was not a bar to the
present action, since an act of negligence may be a proximate cause of
injuries to a passenger and "not necessarily" occupy the same causal re-
lationship in producing injuries to the driver of the same vehicle.240
233. Brief for Appellant at 17a-143a; Brief for Respondent at la-lSa.
234. Brief for Appellant at 145a.
235. Id. at 146a-147a. The negligence of the driver "cannot be imputed to or held
against Henry Dresher riding as a passenger." Id. at 147a.
236. Id. at 157a.
237. Id. at 160a-161a.
238. Id.
239. 325 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1963).
240. 43 Misc. 2d at 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600; see text accompanying note 172 supra.
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Secondly, the prior judgment against D1 as plaintiff was not a bar to
the present suit by 02 and D2 because the jury's observation that both
drivers were negligent was "merely gratuitous."2' 1 Had the jury simply
rendered a verdict of no cause of action without more, the verdict could
have been predicated on the negligence of D1 or the freedom from negli-
gence of D2. Since the court issued no instructions to make special find-
ings, the sole office of the jury was to bring in a general verdict and any
volunteered gloss could not attain the status of a necessarily determined
issue. The court, therefore, confined the application of collateral estoppel
to issues which were essential to reaching a decision in the prior litiga-
tion.
2 42
The appellate division in affirming the denial of defendants' motion for
summary judgment concluded that the prior judgment for P1 could not
be raised as a defense by D1 and 01 because different factors might be
involved. 243 The court also agreed with the decision below that the only
finding necessary to render a verdict in the federal court case against
the plaintiff, D1, was that he was contributorily negligent. 44
Had the contest over the availability of collateral estoppel as a defense
terminated at this point, Cummings would stand for an affirmation of
established judicial interpretation of the doctrine. Since the parties-liti-
gant were not identical in the state and federal cases, a symmetrical
mutuality of estoppel was not present. 40 Even omitting from considera-
tion the fact that the corporate defendant in the second action was an
entirely new party, it still remains that D 1 sought to borrow the judgment
for his passenger in the latter's individual action in federal court against
02 and D2. D1 was not a party in the suit brought by his passenger.
There was no privity or derivative liability.
Nevertheless, the separate actions of D1 and P1 were tried together
against the same defendants before the same judge and jury. How ac-
curately did, or could the jury follow the instructions to consider the
evidence for each plaintiff independently? While, formally, it was un-
necessary to a general verdict of no cause of action in Di's case to make
241. 43 Misc. 2d at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
242. Cambria v. Jeffery, 307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E2d 555 (1940). The contention of the
defendants' attorney was that there was no evidence in the federal court case which would
permit a jury to find D2 negligent to P1 and not to Di. The plaintiffs' attorney emphasized,
on the otherhand, that the verdict was general: "No Comment of the jury %as asked for and
anything blurted out by Juror number 12, acting as Foreman was his own personal opin-
ion ... 2' Record at 41. See Purpora v. Coney Island Dairy Prods. Corp., 262 App. Div.
908, 28 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't 1941).
243. 24 App. Div. 2d 912, 913, 264 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (3d Dep't 1965), revd, 18 N.Y.2d
105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
244. Id. at 913, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 431-32.
245. Id. See also text accompanying note 120 supra.
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a pronouncement of the other driver's negligence, and while the passenger
and driver in one car may be dissimilarly affected by the negligent act
of the driver of the other car, are these principles workable when the evi-
dence draws no clear distinctions between the defendant's negligence vis-
ii-vis the passenger and his negligence vis-At-vis the driver of the same car?
There is no problem in Cummings of an attempted affirmative use of
collateral estoppel since D1 and 01 interposed it as a defense.2 40 Neither
is any question raised of adversarial posture in the prior litigation since
the record revealed that the drivers were active opponents throughout the
joint trial. They were adversaries in federal court on the issues of negli-
gence and contributory negligence.
In reversing the order denying the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, Chief Judge Desmond relied squarely on identity of issues.241
The jury's finding in the federal case that D2 was guilty of negligence
is not treated as gratuitious or fortuitous surplusage but rather in the
nature of a special finding to be accorded the significance which a formal
special finding would have merited, had the court addressed the specific
question to the jury. 48 The "same people were parties and all the same
issues tried and decided" in the prior adjudication.2 4 The actual litiga-
tion and actual decision of the negligence of D2 was the focal point, and
further refinements in terms of a "necessarily determined" issue were not
admitted as a restriction, by the court, upon the availability of estoppel.
The "actual litigation" satisfied the due process requirement of a full
opportunity to contest liability. The "actual decision" was exhibited in
the jury's supplementation of its general verdict.280 The opinion con-
cluded that in the interest of a "non-repetitious judicial system," the
court should give binding effect to the actually decided issue.
Judge (now Chief Judge) Fuld, in a concurring opinion reached the
same result but on a strictly procedural ground. 251 In his view, 02 and D2
246. In the view of the appellate division, if collateral estoppel is to be invoked by one
not a party in the prior case on the theory that the issues are identical, the doctrine may
be used only as a shield.
247. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1966). The court
cited Israel v. Wood Dolson, Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 119, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4
(1956) and Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Low, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 595, 148 N.E.2d 136,
138, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (1957).
248. Is it not particularly appropriate in New York, where plaintiff has both burdens on
the negligence issue, to respect the jury's conclusions?
249. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 107, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977. The corporate
owner of car 1 was not a party in the federal court case but his liability, if any, was
dependent upon the liability of his driver.
250. The inscrutability of the general verdict, the difficulty of determining the actual
finding on which it is based, has aroused the criticism of eminent jurists advocating a greater
use of the special verdict. See pp. 42-47 infra.
251. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 108-09, 218 N.E.2d 688, 690-91, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978-79 (1964).
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as defendants in the former federal proceeding should have interposed a
compulsory counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule 13a. 2 - Having failed
to do so, the same parties were precluded from bringing subsequent causes
of action as plaintiffs on the subject matter of their counterclaim. This ap-
proach raises the interesting possibility of permitting a wider application
of collateral estoppel in cases involving a prior adjudication in federal
court. It also provokes the question of whether the procedural rules of
New York practice should adopt the federal compulsory counterclaim
rule. Perhaps at least in this area of vehicle accident litigation, the New
York legislature should consider this and other measures to channel all
claims arising from the same occurrence into one composite trial. The
underlying theme of the liberalization of party practice and of pleadings
is the avoidance of repetitious litigation. The requirement that those who
are already parties-defendant interpose their claims arising from the same
accident would do no violence to that theme. -"3
If a direct procedural approach such as a compulsory counterclaim is
not available and collateral estoppel is invoked on an "identity of issues"
basis, there is yet the intricate problem of the relationship of parties
which must be faced. Who may borrow the benefit of another's favorable
judgment? If the first adjudication in Cummings (actually two individual
causes of action) by D1 and PI is not treated as a composite (even though
not consolidated) action, and volunteered comments of the jury are si-
lenced by the general verdict, then Dl is indeed interposing for his de-
fense in the second action a prior judgment to which he was not a party
or privy. A general verdict for 02 and D2 in Dl's suit against them need
mean only that Dl was contributorily negligent and 02 and D2 would be
at liberty as plaintiffs to prove their freedom from contributory negligence
in a second action.
In Daly v. Terpening,2-5 the court carefully differentiated the roles of
passenger and driver.2 5 But there was nothing in the record before the
court of appeals in Cummings to justify a division of D2's acts into two
See also United States v. Eastport Steamship Corp., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Home v.
Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959).
252. This point was not raised by the parties in any of the proceedings in the state or
federal courts.
253. In view of the present delays in bringing a negligence case to trial, there will
usually be sufficient time to include in the counterclaim personal injuries which do not
appear immediately.
254. 261 App. Div. 423, 26 N.Y.S.2d 160 (4th Dep't), aff'd mem., 287 N.Y. 611, 39 N.E.2d
260 (1941).
255. See text accompanying note 173 supra. Given the facts of the instant cas.e, a jury
in the consolidated trial of P1's and Dl's claims could quite reasonably conclude that DZ, by
the same act or acts was negligent toward both. Is the technicality that the trial was joint
rather than consolidated a sufficient justification for discarding the reasonable "finding" that
D2 was negligent?
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categories: those affecting D1 and those affecting P1. Chief Judge Des-
mond's opinion does not state, in so many words, that the driver may
avail himself of the passenger's judgment, but such a conclusion may be
implicit in the following passage:
At the close of these Federal court proceedings it was completely clear that the jury
had found that driver Mary Cummings had been found guilty of negligence and that,
therefore, she as driver and her husband as owner had to pay damages to passenger
Henry Dresher. Equally clear was the Federal court jury's finding that driver Bernard
Dresher had been guilty of contributory negligence and so, notwithstanding the found
negligence of driver Mary Cummings, Bernard Dresher could not recover against the
defendants Cummings.25
6
Or does the opinion rest solely upon the jury's statement of the respective
negligence of both drivers in Dl's action?27 In the future interpretations
of this decision, judges may write one of the most provocative chapters in
the tortuous history of collateral estoppel.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the preclusionary effect of a judgment need not, according to
DeWitt,21s be limited by considerations of mutuality, and assuming that
Cummings2 59 does not eliminate the requirement of privity, the two chief
questions affecting an expanded availability of collateral estoppel are:
how may more individuals whose claims or liabilities arise out of the
same event be introduced to the first trial? How may more issues be con-
clusively determined between those who are parties?
The present doctrine of collateral estoppel in New York appears to
permit a prior adjudication to be used offensively or defensively, by
parties, privies and derivatively liable persons, against a former party
or privy. DeWitt may logically be extended to include affirmative use
by the primary actor (indemnitor) where the derivatively liable party
(indemnitee) has obtained a judgment. There are precedents for this ex-
tension, at least as a defensive plea,2 60 which with the abandonment of
the shield-sword distinction, can justify such a development. Also, the
insurer should be able to assert against a former party, offensively or
defensively, a judgment for his insured or the insured's permittee where
the basis of the insurer's non-liability has been determined."'
256. 18 N.Y.2d 105, 107, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1964).
257. The dissent analyzes both avenues by which D1 may assert collateral estoppel: via
the judgment for P1 and the jury's comment on D2's negligence in Dl's action. Id. at
110-13, 218 N.E.2d at 691-93, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 980-82.
258. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
259. Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
260. See note 126 supra.
261. See pp. 44-46 infra.
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If the plaintiff chooses to sue only the driver, a procedure should be
established whereby the owner can be made a party, thus implementing
the legislative policy expressed in the Vehicle and Traffic Law.-0- Present
practice permits a defendant to "proceed against a person not a party
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him.' 2 63 Thus, impleader is not available to the driver in this
case, for the owner's liability, if any, is to the plaintiff.2C
How can the owner be converted into a party? It is suggested that a
practice analogous procedurally, but not substantively,- 11 to "vouching
to warranty" be adopted.266 The procedural similarity lies only in notice
of the litigation 267 which the driver (or possibly the clerk of the court)
would be required to communicate to the owner. The content of the
notice and manner of communication should be reduced to a prescribed
form to insure that the owner will be promptly and adequately alerted.
The owner will be advised of his right to come in and participate fully
in the defense. Finally, the notice should inform the owner that he will
be bound by the judgment whether or not he avails himself of the invita-
tion. Upon appearing, the owner would be free to present, and the court to
weigh, any argument that his interest wil be prejudiced. The court in its
discretion may choose to stay or to transfer the proceedings after con-
sideration of the rights of all the parties involved.
It should be noted that compulsory joinder is in no sense part of the
proposal here advanced. There is no merit in bringing back all of the
former problems attendant upon that rule, now that the practice statute
has substituted a flexible and equitable procedure.2 8 In view of the long
history in this state of the policy of owner responsibility, a fair method
for vouching in the owner, according him a choice to defend or not and
forewarning him of the conclusiveness of the judgment, is worthy of con-
sideration.
Where the absentee owner alone is sued, he has a right of indemnity
against the driver and could implead the latter.,00 However, since the
judgment for the plaintiff will be satisfied out of the owner's liability in-
262. See pp. 4-11 supra.
263. N.Y. C.PL.R. § 1007 (emphasis added).
264. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388.
265. There is no accurate analogy between the owner of a vehicle and the manufacturer
of chattels or the vendor of real property.
266. See 2 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 76, 112-14 (3d ed. 1923); Degnan
& Barton, Vouching to Quality Warranty: Case Law and Commercial Code, 51 Calif. L.
Rev. 471 (1963).
267. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-607(5) (a).
268. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1001.
269. But see note 125 supra.
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surance, the plaintiff's interest would not be advanced by this procedure.
A judgment for or against the owner should be binding upon the driver,
and for that reason, it may be necessary to bring him in. As a practical
matter, however, the plaintiff will seek his full recovery in the suit against
the owner. If DeWitt is extended, the driver could use the owner's favor-
able judgment against the plaintiff since the plaintiff was a party to the
prior adjudication.
Now assume that the plaintiff has joined both owner and driver as co-
defendants. Although they are "joinable" tortfeasors, the liability, if any,
of the driver rests on his own commissions or omissions; the owner's, is
imposed by statute, even though he may be innocent of any fault. The
owner can, therefore, cross claim against the driver and avoid a separate
law suit to enforce his right of indemnification. Cross-claiming would
yield more practical results, however, where the defendants represent dif-
ferent vehiclesY °0 In such a case, the co-defendants should be encouraged,
if not compelled, to interpose any claims between them arising from the
same occurrence. New York's liberal cross claim provision embraces any
claim between co-defendants.2 ' Why should it not require those already
made parties at the plaintiff's election to settle the issue of liability inter
se?
Whether or not compulsion is introduced into present cross claim pro-
cedure, the courts can supply a strong incentive by allowing the first judg-
ment against both defendants to be asserted in a subsequent suit between
them. The argument that defendants are not adversaries has a hollow
sound. Protecting his inchoate right to contribution should be sufficient
stimulus for any defendant to cast fault upon his co-party. The formalistic
adversarial requirement of Glaser22 ought to be discarded so that a judg-
ment may be conclusive between co-defendants.
Where the accident involves more than two vehicles, the possible com-
binations of fault increase as does the complexity of the evidence. A
judgment against some or all of the owners or drivers may not fairly
reflect the interrelationship of their liability. In such case, the judgment
should not be used to cut off a claim where additional facts require con-
sideration. A renunciation of the adversarial rule leaves the applicability
of collateral estoppel open to the discretion of the court.
When the lawsuit is a contest between the owner or driver of one
vehicle and the owner or driver of the other involved in the accident, a
compulsory counterclaim rule would obviate re-trial of the same facts.
While such a requirement would no longer permit the defendant the
270. E.g., P1 v. 01, 02 or 03 v. 01, 02.
271. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(b).
272. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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free choice which he now has, to pursue his cause of action as an inde-
pendent suit rather than as a counterclaim, 27 13 the pressing need to
economize litigation in the accident field outweighs individual preferences.
The philosophy of the liberalized party practice provisions in the CPLR
is to encourage the joining of as many claims as due process and trial
convenience permit.
What expansion, consistent with due process, can be advocated in the
class of persons who may assert collateral estoppel? What of those who
occupy a "litigational or factual privity" relationship-such as the pas-
sengers of the same vehicle, or the passengers and owner or driver of
the same vehicle? It is suggested that a passenger should be able to avail
himself of the judgment for a fellow passenger or for the owner or driver
of his vehicle, and that the owner or driver should be able to assert a
judgment for his passenger, provided, the opposing owner or driver can-
not demonstrate that his conduct toward one was distinguishable from
his conduct toward the other. The burden of proof would be placed upon
the party resisting collateral estoppel. Since it is believed that most ac-
cidents do not occur under circumstances permitting much in the way of
last clear chance, the culpable party will have been negligent both to the
other driver and to the latter's passenger. The door is not closed to proof
of the contrary; but in the absence of such proof, passenger and driver
(or owner) should be able to take advantage of each other's judgment.
Similarly, where the defendant's liability has been conclusively estab-
lished to one passenger, the court should not assume that the defendant's
acts did not, in like manner, affect another passenger. Rather the de-
fendant should be required to demonstrate the divisibility of his conduct.
What has been said above does not reduce the necessity of the plaintiff's
proving his freedom from contributory negligence.
Turning now to the second question-how may the initial litigation
conclude more issues? Assuming a case such as Hinchey v. Sellers,27 4
where the insurer is before the court in the first contest, the thorough
trial of all the facts affecting the question of permission should have con-
clusive effect as to the same evidentiary facts in a later suit involving
the owner or driver. While the ultimate issues are different-permission
as a predicate for insurance coverage, versus permission as a basis for
establishing statutory liability-what the owner and his bailee said or
did can be adduced in testimony and reduced to findings by the court
or by the jury in answer to interrogatories. Similarly, if the owner or
driver is first sued, clearly established evidentiary facts underlying a
determination of permission under Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388
273. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(a).
274. 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.YS.2d 129 (1959).
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should not be re-heard in an action against the insurer. 27' The court's
findings or the jury's specific responses will thus constitute an essential
step in reaching two decisions: the one based on construction of the in-
surance contract, the other on construction of the statute. There is no
preclusion as between these distinct issues.
As to negligence, the court of appeals in DeWitt has clearly stated
that a judgment for the plaintiff-indemnitor-driver is conclusive upon the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence in a subsequent action
against the same defendant by the indemnitee-owner. The same should
obtain where the indemnitee is the initial plaintiff. When the situation
is reversed and the indemnitor is sued and wins, the judgment necessarily
determines only the contributory negligence of the losing plaintiff.
20
Thus, there are obstacles to the affirmative use of the judgment either
by the indemnitor or indemnitee.
Absent a gratuitous observation of the jury or one which the court
chooses to recognize, the general verdict does not speak to the question
of the winning defendant's negligence. However, the matter may be clari-
fied by instructions to the jury to make special findings on both points-
negligence and contributory negligence. While this theoretically requires
the jury to deliberate upon an additional and separate matter, the jury
in most cases probably formulates a conclusion as to the negligence of
each party. In New York, since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof
on both scores, the matters are in issue, and the evidentiary basis should
be laid at the trial for determination of the negligence of each party.
The judge might be aided in this respect by the formulation of pattern
interrogatories, similar to the pattern jury instructions prepared by jus-
tices of New York's supreme court.77 Much has been said about the de-
ficiencies of the general verdict.2 78 The availability and utilization of a
simplified procedure for special findings can enlarge the preclusionary
scope of the first judgment.
While the strictures that the binding proposition be ultimate2 70 and
275. As a practical matter, counsel for the insurer will contest the issue of permission
in all three cases. The court ought, however, to apprise the attorneys representing the
individual parties, of the significance of the factual determinations relating to permission
and enlist their cooperation in achieving a full hearing.
276. Cambria v. Jeffery, 307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940); see Cummings v.
Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 218 N.E.2d 688, 691, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976, 979 (1966) (Bergan, J.
dissenting).
277. Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Association of Supreme Court
Justices, New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil (1965).
278. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948); Sunderland,
Verdicts, General and Special, 29 Yale L.J. 253 (1920).
279. See text accompanying notes 191-96, 219-24 supra.
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necessarily determined28° reflect a laudable and meticulous concern lest
a party be bound on a matter he or the court treats collaterally, it does
seem that an adequate measure of protection flows from the requirement
that the conclusive proposition shall have been actually litigated.28 Add
to this the requirement that the matter determined be an essential step in
reaching the final result, and a liberal and adaptable rule for issue binding
emerges. It may appear too free-form but it is recommended for the
typical accident case. Its operation must always be stayed where the
resisting party can demonstrate the unfairness or inadequacy of the hear-
ing.
It is acknowledged that if the innovations suggested above were imple-
mented, the format of the accident case would be less like an individu-
alistic duel and more like a tri-partite engagement in which the public
interest in efficient judicial administration would be omnipresent. That,
however, is not a frivolous consideration. If the plaintiff no longer enjoys
free rein in managing his lawsuit, he may be rewarded by a speedier and
more comprehensive adjudication.
Judges in the past have not reposed sufficient confidence in themselves
to tolerate the operation of collateral estoppel without a network of strin-
gent rules. The exceptions that have evolved, and the formalistic controls
that have been abandoned, bear witness to the fact that there is no
substitute for trained judicial judgment as the best means for safeguard-
ing the right of due process.
280. See text accompanying notes 192-94 supra.
281. See text accompanying note 250 supra.
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APPENDIX
In the diagrammatic representations employed, all parties owning, driving,
occupying as passengers or insuring the first car will be represented by the
postscript "1"; those associated with the second car will bear the postscript "2,"
etc. The alphabetical designations will be "0" for owner, "D" for driver, "P"
for passenger and "Ir" for insurer. The symbol "J/" represents "judgment for."
The Roman numerals "I" and "II" will indicate the first action and the second
action respectively. Thus:
I. 01 v. 02 - J/01
means that in the first action the owner of the first car sued the owner of the
second car and judgment was rendered for the former.
HAVERHILL v. INTERNATIONAL RY., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S.
522 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 244 N.Y. 582, 155 N.E. 905 (1927),
overruded, B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
I. D1 v. 02 - J/D1
II. 01 v. 02 - 01 may not use
J/D 1
NEENAN v. WOODSIDE ASTORIA TRANSPORTATION CO., 261 N.Y.
159, 184 N.E. 744 (1933).
I. ODI v. 02 - J/OD 1
II. P2 v. OD1, 02 - ODI may not use
J/OD1
GOOD HEALTH DAIRY PRODUCTS CORP. v. EMERY, 275 N.Y. 14, 9
N.E.2d 758 (1937).
I. D1 v. 02, D2 - J/D1
II. 02, D2 v. 01, D1 - D1 may use J/D1
- 01 may use J/D1
ELDER v. NEW YORK & PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR EXPRESS, INC.,
284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
I. 101 v. 02
02 V. 01 - 5/01
II. D1 v. 02 - D1 may not use
J/01
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DALY v. TERPENING, 261 App. Div. 423, 26 N.Y.S.2d 160 (4th Dep't
1941), aff'd mere., 287 N.Y. 611, 39 N.E.2d 260 (1941).
I. D1
II. P1 (by
Dl)
III. D2
V. D2
V. D2
v. Dl
- J/D2
-J/P 1
- D I may not use
J/P 1
KINNEY v. STATE, 191 Misc. 128, 75 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
v. State
v. State
- J/PI
- P2 may use J/PI
UNITED MUTUAL FIRE INS. CO. v. SAELI, 272 App. Div. 951, 71
N.Y.S.2d 696 (4th Dep't), affd mere., 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1947).
I. A
II. A
V. 01, D1
V. D2
V. X
V. Y
HINCHEY v. SELLERS, 7 N.Y.2d 287,
(1959).
I. P1
II. PI
V. Irl
V. 01
- J/01, D1
- J/D1
- Irl, 01 may use
J/O1, DI and
J/D 1
N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151
- J/X
- Y may use J/X
165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129
- J/Irl
- 01 may use evi-
dentiary basis of
J/Irl
QUATROCHE v. CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO., 11 App. Div. 2d 665,
201 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1st Dep't 1960).
I. 01, D1 V. 02
II. P1 V. 02
- J/O1, D1
- P1 may not use
J/01, Dl
I. P1
II. P2
I. jD2I. DI
Il. Irl, 01 v. D2
ISRAEL v. WOOD DOLSON CO., I
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
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MINKOFF v. BRENNER, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d
47 (1962).
v. Dl, 02, D2 - J/03
v. 02, D2 -- 02, D2 may not use
J/03
CUMMINGS v. DRESHER, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d
976 (1966).
III. 02, D2
V. 02, D2
v. 02, D2
V. 01,Dl
- J/P1
- J/02, D2
- O1, D1 may use
J/P1
B.R. DE WITT, INC. v. HALL, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d
596 (1967).
I. D I v. 02 - J/D I
I. 03
II. DI
II. 01 v. 02 - 01 may use J/D1
